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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE POST
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: NORTHERN UGANDA
CASE STUDY**

by

Laura J. Perazzola

December 2011

Thesis Advisor:
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**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE POST CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT:
NORTHERN UGANDA CASE STUDY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MID EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

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ABSTRACT

Northern Uganda has suffered a violent civil conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), for over two decades. The conflict has resulted in over 1.6 million internally displaced persons within Uganda, as well as over 66,000 children abducted and forced into soldiering. In 2006, the LRA could no longer sustain the fight against the Government of Uganda and fled to into Southern Sudan. Northern Uganda shifted from a combat zone into an extremely complex post conflict environment. The Government of Uganda began reconstruction efforts to piece the region back together with a series of programs, projects and donors. Central to the overall efforts towards security and development was the Ugandan military, the UPDF. The UPDF conducted a series of civil-military operations to assist in reconstruction and post conflict operations within its own borders. Using the Northern Uganda post conflict environment, this study will explore the impact of civil-military operations within the overall of post conflict operations, to include stability and counterinsurgency operations. Through the Ugandan example, this study will determine the salience of civil military operations in post conflict operations as both a force multiplier and a means to gain popular support for the government.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAR	Central African Republic
CIMIC	Civil Military Center
CMCC	Civil Military Coordination Center
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CPA	Compact Peace Agreement
DOS	U.S. Department of State
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Commission
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GOU	Government of Uganda
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	Inter-government Organization
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
PRDP	Peace, Reconstruction and Development Plan
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force
USG	United States Government
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. NORTHERN UGANDA'S POST CONFLICT LANDSCAPE

For over two decades, from 1986 to 2006, Northern Uganda suffered a violent civil conflict. After a series of insurgencies emerged from the northern Acholiland in the late 1980s, one rebel group finally absorbed all the remaining movements. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), established in 1988 and led by Joseph Kony, waged war against the government of Uganda.¹ Joseph Kony and LRA are one in the same. Without Kony's charismatic leadership, the movement could not have grown or survived as long as it has. Over two decades of fighting on Ugandan soil ended in 2006, after the LRA lost external support from Sudan and the Ugandan Army waged massive offensive operations in both Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda. The LRA fled Northern Uganda and sought refuge in Southern Sudan; the insurgency was weakened but still intact. Despite its exit from Uganda, the LRA still remains active in the region, executing attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. Though Joseph Kony and his army have not been able to physically return to Uganda since 2006, their rebellion left much destruction and misery in its wake.

During the conflict, most of the fighting took place in Northern Uganda, as the Uganda's People Defense Force (UPDF) executed its own brutal counterinsurgency against the LRA. The war between Kony and the UPDF left the region devastated. The International Crisis Group estimates that over 2 million people have been displaced since the conflict began. Also, the LRA has abducted over 66,000 children and made atrocious use of many as child soldiers.² In addition to the missing children and millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), Northern Uganda was left with a shattered economy

¹ Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

² Finnstrom, S. "Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord's Resistance Movement/Army in Uganda." *Journal of International African Institute* 76, no. No. 2 (2006): 200.

and an entire population that felt marginalized and abused by both its government and the rebellion.³ With the LRA problem pushed outside its borders, the government of Uganda was left to face the challenges of rebuilding a war torn region.

Northern Uganda shifted from a combat zone and currently presents itself as a complex post conflict environment. Both sides of the conflict committed egregious acts against the civilian population in the north.⁴ The people of Northern Uganda were caught between the horrifying human rights violations of Joseph Kony and the brutal tactics of the Ugandan military for more than twenty-years. By the time the conflict ceased, the population was reluctant to return to their homes, or even believe that peace had come to their region.⁵ The government of Uganda and the international community took notice of the post conflict conditions in Northern Uganda. Understanding the need to rebuild and develop the region, reconstruction efforts from the government and international agencies began piecing the region back together with a series of programs, projects and donors. Central to the overall efforts towards both security and development was the Ugandan military, the UPDF. Especially during the early post-conflict phases of 2006, the UPDF was one of the few governmental entities with the ability to operate and provide humanitarian relief to the IDP camps and resettlements. The UPDF continued to maintain a presence in the region as the government began to transition functions back to civil authorities such as an active police force. The UPDF has over 1,600 soldiers deployed to the North to assist with vast complexity of post conflict issues, which include crime, land disputes, IDP resettlement, food security issues, and fear of the LRA returning.⁶

3 “Counter LRA Reporting and Analysis.” Collection of Multiple open source materials, Reports can be obtained through the OIC, Defense Resources Management Initiative (DRMI) Office of the Defense Attache U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda. Org E-mail: DRMIorg@gmail.com.

4 Hopwood, Julian. “We can’t be Sure Who Killed U.S.: Memory and Memorialization in Post-Conflict Northern Uganda (13–14).” International Center for Transitional Justice: Justice and Reconciliation Project (February 2011, 2011).

5 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

6 “Ugandan Human Rights Commission Annual Report: 2009–2010.” Uganda Human Rights Commission (2010). http://www.uhrc.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=111

Since 2006, the government of Uganda has shifted the use of its military from kinetic operations like actively hunting the LRA to a force that integrates the concept of non-kinetic concepts such as civil military operations (CMO) into its overall strategy in the north. Because of the prevalence of civilians in any military operation, CMO has been integrated into various military operations, such as counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations, peacekeeping operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). CMO has also been integrated in the various phases of warfare from shaping through transition.⁷

Using CMO, the UPDF's focus has become the population and not the LRA. This shift is apparent in both the way the UPDF approached the post conflict environment in the north as well as the way it engaged in its final phases of counterinsurgency operations. Northern Uganda poses a unique challenge for the UPDF as a post conflict environment in terms of both security and development. Though the LRA no longer bases in Northern Uganda, it is still an active armed group that has voiced its intent on returning to the country. The UPDF therefore must address the LRA as a current and real threat, not only to Uganda, but the entire region.

The UPDF's integration of CMO is a means to address the LRA threat indirectly. The LRA emerged from a set of circumstances and core grievances felt by the people in the north. The LRA exploited those grievances and conditions in order to create and grow an insurgency. The LRA preyed on the situation of the Acholi population specifically. CMO provides way for the UPDF, and the government, overall to address the needs and concerns in the North. Because the LRA was a manifestation of the Acholi plight, the government must construct a means to gap the disconnect between the north and the central government in order to mitigate the risk of future uprisings. Until the suffering and disparity in the north is met with projects, humanitarian assistance, security, and other CMO tactics the north will not be able to move past the conflict.

Despite the fact the LRA has physically left Uganda, it haunts development and forward momentum. As long as the LRA remains in existence, the people in Northern

7 JP 3-57 "Civil-Military Operations." Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (08 July 2008, 2008).

Uganda are hesitant to resettle and develop the region.⁸ In this vein, the LRA problem has only been exported to other countries in the region and can eventually disrupt security and stability throughout the Great Lakes region to include Uganda. Other security issues that threaten the reconstruction of the north are issues of land disputes with the resettlement of IDP's, armed outlaws, cattle raiding in the Karamoja Region and food security. The UPDF made efforts to handle these difficult post conflict situations through various CMO activities. The UPDF's use of CMO is not only a mechanism to counter the damages caused by the LRA, but also it is other way to approach other security issues that plague the region. Despite these challenges, the north is slowly rebuilding itself from twenty years of conflict.

The UPDF and its use of CMO activities are relatively new tools in the larger stability and counterinsurgency operations in Northern Uganda. The UPDF's shift to non-kinetic operations, better treatment of the north's Acholi population, and civilian-centric activities are all efforts to rebuild civil society and stability in Northern Uganda. This study will examine the impact of the UPDF's civil military operations (CMO) within the overall of post conflict reconstruction strategy in Northern Uganda, to include stability and counterinsurgency operations. It argues that the UPDF's civil military operations have been instrumental in the post conflict reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda through small and large infrastructure projects, the transition of civil authority, the protection of the population, the ability to provide basic services to the population and the overall coordination with other development partners.

B. IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN A NON-KINETIC ENVIRONMENT?

In recent years, the concept of irregular warfare (IW) has become the framework for military operations. Conventional interstate military to military engagements are on the decline, but intra-state conflicts and IW are on the rise.⁹ In intra-state conflicts,

8 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

9 Fearon, J.D. & Latin, David. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (Feb 2003, 2003): 75.

whether the military operations are full on Clausewitz-style warfare against an insurgency or conducting peacekeeping operations (PKO), there exists a local population that is affected by the fighting. No matter where a conflict sits in the grand spectrum of violence, any military operation will ultimately involve a civilian population.¹⁰ No matter if the population is hostile, neutral or friendly, it can be a crucial source of information, provide support to either side of the conflict, and can affect the combatants that operate in the area. Civilians have been and will always be a critical factor in every military operation. CMO is a method in which a military engages the population and builds relationships.

CMO is defined by the U.S. Joint Forces as “the activities of a commander to establish collaborative relationships among military forces ... and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate overall military operations.”¹¹ Other military organizations use the term Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) to define the coordination of civilian and military units.¹² The Joint Publication for Civil-Military Operations identifies CMO as a primary military tool that synchronizes military and nonmilitary instruments namely in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations that deal with asymmetric threats or irregular warfare.¹³ The concept of integrating CMO-type operations into traditional military operations is not a new concept. Major military powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France have recognized the salience of CMO since as early as the Second World War.¹⁴

Though CMO is not a novel concept, the way it is integrated into the post conflict phase of operations is an area that needs be studied. The increased frequency of civil conflicts has left many countries in ruins as they begin to rebuild themselves from the ashes of war. This study seeks to answer the following questions: can the military that

10 Salmoni, B. and Holmes-Eber, P. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008.

11 JP 3-57 “Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (08 July 2008, 2008).

12 Franke, Volker. “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 6.

13 “Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (08 July 2008, 2008).

14 Fishel, J. T. *Civil Military Operations in the New World*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997.

was once a force of destruction provide a critical role in reconstruction and the post conflict environment? Does CMO have a pertinent after the conflict has ceased? If so, then how can CMO be effectively integrated in a complex post conflict environment? The conflict in Northern Uganda provides a case with a classic insurgency in the sense that the LRA was an armed faction that wished to oust the current regime. This insurgency created a conflict that lasted twenty-five years. At the same time, the LRA provides unique circumstances for COIN strategists because it does not fall neatly into any insurgent category.¹⁵ Since the LRA physically relocated from Northern Uganda all major combat operations in the north have ceased, making it a post conflict area. Also, the insurgency moved to a reliance on forced recruitment and does not use the population to support its cause, but instead conducts raids on the local population to sustain itself. The LRA no longer hides amongst the Acholi population in Northern Uganda, rather it lives in seclusion inside Garamba National Park in the eastern region of the DRC. With the LRA exiled in Southern Sudan and the DRC, begs the question what is the point of CMO in Northern Uganda?

C. CMO IN UGANDA

The LRA's ruthless approach of using violence against civilian populations left Northern Uganda devastated from decades of conflict. The LRA continues to conduct attacks and violent operations in CAR, DRC, and Southern Sudan.¹⁶ Their brutal methods of engagements changed little over the past twenty-five years. Abducting children and terrorizing local populations with forced recruitments, rape, and robbery are all continuing tactics the LRA employs. Fear of the LRA and mandatory relocation by the UPDF caused millions to be displaced from the north.¹⁷ Though the government of Uganda is working to move the IDPs back to their original homes, Gulu and other cities in the area are faced with numerous economic and humanitarian issues. UNHCR reports

¹⁵ McCormick, Gordon. "People's Wars." *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since WWII*. New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc.

¹⁶ "Counter LRA Reporting and Analysis." Collection of Multiple open source materials, Reports can be obtained through the OIC, Defense Resources Management Initiative (DRMI) Office of the Defense Attache U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda. Org E-mail: DRMIorg@gmail.com.

¹⁷ Ibid.

that there are still 370,000 IDPs unable to return home as of 2010.¹⁸ Civilians returning to the north face issues of rebuilding their lives, their society and recovering from the violence. They are still vulnerable to the conditions that led to the initial insurgency.

The LRA has devastated the Acholi in Northern Uganda. Between 500,000 to 800,000 Acholi were moved into IDP camps, some estimate that was up to 80 percent of the entire Acholi population.¹⁹ At the same time, the UPDF has used harsh methods to counter the insurgency, further victimizing the area's residents. Throughout the early 1990s and into the final military operations in 2006, there were numerous accusations of the UPDF committing as atrocities on its own people as had the LRA before them.²⁰ Robert Feldman specifically looks at why it took over twenty years to drive the LRA out of Uganda with the core leadership of the group still intact. He views this timeline as a failure on the UPDF's part and that the government of Uganda could have rid itself of the LRA problem much sooner. Feldman concludes that the UPDF was not professional enough to handle its own population, suffering from a lack in training and coordination. The UPDF did not start off has a regular state army; it began as rebel movement called the National Resistance Army (NRA). The force was young and not made up of professional soldiers at its inception.²¹ The UPDF's heavy-handed tactics alienated the population. While the population did not support Kony and his violence, they did not trust the government or its military.²²

Another issue, which permeates through the UPDF's earlier COIN strategy, was the lack of civilian protection.²³ The UPDF launched several operations with the specific

18 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

19 Dunn, Kevin. "Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 99 (March 2004, 2004): 139.

20 Ibid.

21 Tangri, Roger & Mwenda, Andrew. "Military Corruption & Ugandan Politics since the Late 1990s." *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 98 (December 2003, 2003).

22 Feldman, R. "Why Uganda has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army." *Defense & Security Analysis* 24, no. 1 (March 2008, 2008): 45.

23 Spiegel, J. and Atama, N. "Finishing the Fight Against the LRA." Enough (2009).

intent to capture or kill Kony and completely annihilate the LRA. The first major offensive was called Operation North, which launched in 1991. The second major counterinsurgency push was called Operation Iron Fist in 2006. This was the last major kinetic operation that occurred on Ugandan soil. The last major combat operation mounted against the LRA was Operation Lighting Thunder in 2008. Operation Lighting Thunder was executed in Garamba National Park in DRC territory. Each operation successfully killed hundreds of LRA soldiers, but failed to dismantle the entire movement. Kony stayed alive and with him, so did the LRA. A major consequence of these named operations was that all led to severe reprisals from the LRA towards the civilian populations. Though the LRA suffered losses in these attacks and military analysts project the organization is in a desperate state, the LRA still has the capacity to conduct operations. Each of these operations illustrates how the UPDF's concentration was on a decisive military battlefield victory. UPDF was not able to achieve its ultimate goal of eliminating the LRA threat in its entirety. Not only has the LRA has survived the UPDF's most intense kinetic efforts, but each time retaliated against unprotect civilian populations.²⁴

During the final stages of the war into the post conflict phase in Uganda, the UPDF changed its approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations. With training from partners in the UN, International Red Cross Committee (ICRC), Canada, and the U.S., the UPDF sought to integrate concepts of CMO into its over arching strategy. The UPDF partnered with other organizations conducted veterinary projects, refurbishments of infrastructure, and other traditional civil affairs type projects. The UPDF has shown an interest in growing its CMO capability by establishing Civil Military Coordination Centers (CMCC) in conjunction with its CMO projects. This study will provide an in depth analysis of the role of CMO in a non-kinetic environment as a tool for the UPDF and the implications of the UPDF conducting CMO operations within its own territory.

24 Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? the Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process." Chap. 10, In *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 187. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

By examining how the UPDF uses CMO in a post conflict Northern Uganda, one can apply those lessons to other post conflict environments.

D. METHODOLOGY

Because the major research question is how CMO is integrated into a post conflict environment, the methodology of an in depth case study of the UPDF will be used. This study will have a multi-tiered research design. First, it will examine literature on post conflict issues such as continued COIN operations, stability operations, and the humanitarian relief involved in the complex environment. Next, a broad overview of CMO will be analyzed to establish the theoretical framework for the study. Next, the UPDF CMO operations in Northern Uganda will be examined in detail. Resources for CMO activities will include media coverage both local and international, after action reports from the UPDF or its partnered force, NGO reporting and UPDF military publications will be examined. Using the resources mentioned, this study will determine what are the UPDF's CMO goals in the north. In the absence of UPDF published doctrine, primarily CMO principles of the U.S. military will fill the gaps.

This thesis will be organized by first examining the complexities of a post conflict landscape. The next chapter will thoroughly examine what are the CMO roles in a post conflict environment to include COIN and stability operations with their subsequent phases. Once the framework is established then this study will take an in depth look at the Uganda case study. When looking at Uganda, the LRA insurgency will be put into context by exploring the history of Ugandan insurgencies. Since the LRA is a third generation insurgency, it is essential to examine the root causes of these uprisings.

The next focus of the thesis will be specific to the development of the UPDF and its strategy both during and after the conflict. This chapter will examine how the UPDF has approached the LRA problem in the past as well as current operations. In this chapter the goals of the UPDF will be examined and it will be determined if the ends and the means match.

This organizational structure was chosen because it starts the audience with the larger question of the relationship of CMO in a complex post conflict environment and

then narrows into the Ugandan case study. This thesis is about the application of CMO in a post conflict environment, using the UPDF's conflict with the LRA as a vehicle to drive the study. By using the Uganda post conflict environment, this study will explore the impact of CMO within the overall of post conflict reconstruction strategy, to include stability and counterinsurgency operations. It seeks to prove that civil military operations are instrumental in the post conflict reconstruction efforts through the completion of infrastructure projects, the transition of civil authority, the protection of the population, the ability to provide basic services to the population and the overall coordination with other development partners.

II. THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

A. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE POST CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The focus of this chapter is to examine the human dimension within the broad scope of military operations that can occur in a post conflict environment. Though the physical environment can be demanding, it is the human dimension that will drive the complexity of the situation in a post-conflict environment. Counterinsurgency operations (COIN), stability and reconstruction operations, and even humanitarian assistance (HA) can occur throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations to include non-combat environments. COIN, stability operations and HA are the three specific types of military operations within a post conflict environment to be explored in this chapter, which will show that military doctrine and scholars alike point to the local population as the center of gravity in these three operations. Studying the human dimension throughout post conflict operations will provide the framework for justifying the use of civil-military operations in post conflict environments.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, intra-state conflicts are on the rise. As more and more states find themselves plagued with internal conflicts, these states will eventually have to contend with post-war issues. Once combat operations cease, a military then has the complex duty of transitioning to a post conflict environment. According to William Flavin, the most difficult task for a military is to take broad political guidance and produce military objectives once kinetic operations have stopped.²⁵ The Secretary General of the UN describes the complexity of post conflict objectives as follows:

Actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Experience shows that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace

²⁵ Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003, 2003): 99.

building effort is needed to address the various factors, which caused or are threatening to reignite a conflict.²⁶

In the vastly complicated post-war environment, a military is tasked with providing a safe environment for the restoration of good governance and rule of law.²⁷ The restoration of peace can come in the form of continued COIN, stability and reconstruction operations and HA. By effectively understanding the human dynamics with those three types of operations, a military can be successful in the post conflict environment.

B. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Prevailing conflict resolution theory asserts that in order to have successful conflict termination, one must first understand the nature of the conflict by analyzing the key issues that caused the conflict to emerge and have the potential to spur future problems.²⁸ Those same concepts can be applied when examining COIN operations. COIN cannot be addressed until an insurgency and the nature of the conflict are explored. “Successful COIN operations require comprehensive knowledge of the [operational environment], including an understanding of the insurgents, [and] the scope of the insurgency...”²⁹ By examining the complex dynamics of a conflict, the desire to influence and gain support from the population will emerge as a main focus for all the players. The asymmetrical characteristics of an insurgency verse the state plays an important role in developing the human dimension within the conflict. This is not to say that all rebellions are alike and only follow a particular set of rules. However, the limitations of an insurgency at the onset of the conflict shape the way it engages a local population. These restrictive properties also affect the way a counterinsurgent force seeks to counteract the insurgents. Through a discussion of excepted theories on insurgencies and COIN, one

26 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* December 2001, chapter 1 “The Policy Challenge,” and chapter 2 “A New Approach: ‘The Responsibility to Protect.’” <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>

27 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* December 2001, chapter 1 “The Policy Challenge,” and chapter 2 “A New Approach: ‘The Responsibility to Protect.’” <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>

28 Flavin, William. “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.” *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003, 2003): 103.

29 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3–24 Joint Publications, 2009.

will see that the main focus of both an insurgent or a counterinsurgent force is to win the support of the population that each side seeks political power over.

1. The Making of an Insurgency

Because of the nature of counterinsurgency operations, it cannot exist without an insurgency to fight. The entire conflict is ignited and based on the actions of an insurgency attempting to seize power or change existing power structures while the counterinsurgency aims to maintain the status quo.³⁰ At the onset, an insurgency movement has three distinct characteristics that define it and motivate its actions - size, capability/resources, and the need for popular support. These characteristics drive the way an insurgency acts and how it integrates the population and other human dimensions in its strategy. By studying these characteristics within an insurgency, one can derive the way in which insurgents engage both a counterinsurgency and a local population. This study will use the following definition for an insurgency: “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority...”³¹ By this definition, an insurgent group seeks a political goal to overthrow or change the state through violence. The political nature of an insurgent movement differentiates it from other forms of intrastate violence such as banditry or organized crime. Though those other forms of violence may threaten state stability, the definition of an insurgency is as much about the use of violence as the intent of the activity.

The political nature of an insurgency, along with its size, capacity and need for population support characterize the ways it uses violence. The first characteristic of interest when describing the mode of operation for an insurgency is the size of a rebellion. An insurgency starts as the smaller and weaker force; if a political movement were more powerful than its adversary then it would use its strength to overtly change the offending government. In order to overcome its inherent weakness, an insurgency will

30 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964.

31 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3-24 Joint Publications, 2009. (pI-1)

avoid any major or direct confrontations with counterinsurgent forces. A small number of mobile insurgents can cause chaos and disorder within a larger area. The methods for causing disorder and chaos are relatively cheap and easy to apply. An insurgency has an advantage in being small and fluid.³² If an insurgency's actions are successful, it calls the government's legitimacy into question in the eyes of its constituents- the local population. The counterinsurgency is forced to spend large amounts of money and resources restoring order and re-legitimizing the state's authority. While a counterinsurgency is typically tied to conventional constraints such as fixed installations, lines of communications and defending these critical vulnerabilities, an insurgent force has no key installation that it must stay and defend. It can always run and fight another day.³³ In this way, an insurgent is able to capitalize on the fluid and mobile nature of his forces.

The next characteristic of an insurgency is limited resources and capability. Knowing it is the smaller force in the conflict, an insurgency uses time and money to its advantage in a strategy of attrition in order to wear down its enemy. Limited resources affect the way in which an insurgency fights. An insurgency will engage in a long and protracted war in which the state's will begins to erode in the face of lost legitimacy. An insurgency can pace its use of guerilla warfare, subversion, and terrorism in such a way so that it expends minimal resources. At the same time, to protect multiple fixed points, restore order and essentially police the local areas, a counterinsurgency effort must undertake massive costs and resources to fight a seemingly small and invisible force. An insurgency only has to "not lose" rather than have a decisive military victory over the counterinsurgency.³⁴ A rebel force uses the "death by 1,000 paper cuts" mentality to defeat the enemy.

There are instances where an insurgency is able to garnish support from external sources and even secure natural resources within its area of control. Access to resources

32 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

33 Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.

34 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3-24 Joint Publications, 2009.

can change the strategy of an insurgency, but the nature of an insurgency stays the same regardless of resource control. Belligerents tend to use whatever means are accessible to them to finance or profit from war.³⁵ External support can come in the form of money, weapons, political support, or technical assistance. Typically, such external support allows an insurgency to graduate from basic guerilla tactics to more sophisticated operations, resulting in the creation of a regular army.³⁶ If there are resources available in an insurgency-controlled area then combatants rely less on external third-party support and more control over resources. The existence of such resources may lead to outside support on all sides of the conflict, as both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces seek to control the resources.³⁷

The existence of resource revenues can change the nature of how the conflict is fought and prolong intrastate wars in several ways. The first effect is that it allows a weaker party to continue fighting. Second, the organization and cohesion of an armed group can be impacted by access to resources, which may increase the duration of the conflict. Third, the location of the resources and type of resource can impact the intensity and where the fighting takes place. Fourth, with money flowing in, a rebel force has more to gain through the conflict than peace. It makes peace talks slower and less likely to succeed. Finally, third party resolve can be weakened by the prospect of gaining access to the resources.³⁸ Regardless of whether resources are supplied externally or from within a rebellion, once a rebellion has access it is able to finance and prolong the fight.

A rebellion, at the onset, must be able to generate popular support, the third characteristic of an insurgency. Even if an insurgency has access to internal resources, it must gain momentum to become a true movement, otherwise it can stagnate into a gang

³⁵ Le Billion, Phillipe. *Fueling War: Resources and Armed Conflicts*. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

³⁶ Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

Le Billion, Phillipe. *Fueling War: Resources and Armed Conflicts*. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

³⁸ Le Billion, Phillipe. *Fueling War: Resources and Armed Conflicts*. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

of criminals. Whether resources are internally or externally provided, a movement needs a base of support. A successful insurgency generally will have a core grievance and a strong ideological cause to attract support from the population. The goal is to take up a cause that will appeal to the largest number of supporters and at the same time deter potential opponents.³⁹ The more a majority of the population identifies with an insurgency through its cause, the more the movement will gain support and traction. Typically insurgents base their political movements on greed, desire for economic gain, or grievance, a catch-all to include a wide range of perceived injustices in order to mobilize large swaths of the population.⁴⁰ The nature of the cause is key to an insurgent's recruitment and local buy in. The cause must be broad enough to encompass a large base of the population. The strong ideological nature of the cause usually provides an insurgency with a strong will to fight.⁴¹ Thus an insurgency tends to structure the conflict as a "contest of wills" against his opponent.

The size, capability, and need for popular support are all dynamics that define the nature of an insurgency. The population is central to an insurgency because of its limiting characteristics. By providing support, material, moral, ideological, and personnel, the population helps an insurgency to overcome its inherent weakness vis a vis the government. Even if an insurgency is able to secure resources outside the population, it still is dependent on the population to hide, blend, and live until it is large enough challenge on the state's security forces directly. Resource driven conflicts are much less about the winning "hearts and minds" of the population; however, an armed group risks losing legitimacy if the adversary portrays the group as bandits and criminals verse a true movement. For this reason, even resource independent insurgencies have to gain support

39 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

40 Englebert, Pierre and Ron, James. "Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse." *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 1 (2004): 62.

41 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3-24 Joint Publications, 2009.

from the local population, or they will never be anything other than criminals and never gain enough political legitimacy and influence to change the current government.⁴²

Though an insurgency is able to make use of its limiting factors and use those characteristics to its advantage, at some point in the conflict, an insurgency must be able to grow to a size and capability of eventually taking on counterinsurgent forces directly and defeating them. An insurgency needs manpower to survive, grow, and ultimately to win.⁴³ Being small and fluid may be an advantage for the insurgency during the onset of the conflict, but if it is to ever going to challenge the government directly it will need to mass in size and capacity. In addition to growing its force, an insurgency does not have state-run infrastructures to provide supplies, money, ammunition and other war materials. An insurgency needs support and a way to balance the odds that are stacked against them. The appropriate material conditions for organizing an effective insurgency are difficult to achieve, in other words revolutionary supplies are short. The more risk starting an insurgent movement the less likely it is to succeed.

There are ways for an insurgency to gain the resources required to sustain itself such as external support from other governments, contributions from diaspora and exploiting primary commodities.⁴⁴ However, a population is another means to that end. Joint Publication 3–24 states, “an insurgency typically succeeds or fails based on the support of the population.”⁴⁵ Thus an insurgency must attract support from the population in order to win the conflict. A rebellion may be able to survive on resources and money from outside, but if it ever wants to achieve the goal of overthrowing or changing the status quo, it must grow into an armed group that can win. The population is key to that growth and momentum. A successful insurgency will start small and limited, but grow large. The pool of bodies and capable fighters must come from the

42 Englebert, Pierre and Ron, James. “ Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse.” *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 1 (2004): 61.

43 McCormick, Gordon & Giordano, Frank. “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla Mobilization “ *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 295.

44 Englebert, Pierre and Ron, James. “ Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse.” *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 1 (2004): 63.

45 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3–24 Joint Publications, 2009.

population. Throughout the conflict, an insurgency needs to stay connected to the population, or otherwise it will stagnate or wither away. For this reason insurgent forces constantly battle the counterinsurgent forces for influence over the population.

2. Counterinsurgency

It seems intuitive that a counterinsurgency holds the opposite challenges than an insurgency. In the words of Michael Shafer, “If insurgency was but a tactic a counter tactic is needed.”⁴⁶ A logical argument for developing a strong counterinsurgency strategy is to apply the principles and insurgent tactics in reverse. The counterinsurgency characteristics are in direct contrast to an insurgency, it is large in size and sustained by resources provided by state. In contrast to an insurgency, it has a robust capability. And because a counterinsurgency force is the state’s army, it does not need popular support at the onset of the conflict. This dynamic can change as an insurgency gains traction and is successful. Never the less, a counterinsurgency is supported by the state. Counterinsurgencies, due to their size, start conflicts with a distinct military advantage over insurgent forces. However, their larger size and traditional military structures make them slow to move and more rigid than the small fluid insurgency. A counterinsurgency must be able to suppress an insurgency by identifying the threat, isolating it from the population, and then defeating it.⁴⁷ The major challenge for a counterinsurgency is gaining the intelligence and “on the ground” knowledge to isolate an insurgency, which hides within the population. Intelligence has to come from the population, and no one will provide information if an insurgency maintains power and control over that population. Counterinsurgent forces have to be able to convince the population that it will be protected and reprisals will not befall them, should they provide details on the insurgent forces.

Joint Publication 3–24, COIN doctrine, begins its chapter on counterinsurgency by stating, “the population is the critical dimension of successful

46 Shafer, D. Michael. “The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency.” *Political Science Quarterly* 103, no. 1 (Spring, 1988): p61.

47 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

COIN.”⁴⁸ Just as an insurgent depends on the population and derives support through its ability to influence the population, so too is a counterinsurgent dependant on the population. David Galula explains in his first law of counterinsurgency warfare, “The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for an insurgent.”⁴⁹ A counterinsurgency has the means to rid an area of insurgents by its sheer mass and strength; the problem is keeping that area clear of insurgents once operations cease. Counterinsurgency operations cannot prevent new insurgent cells from reemerging and rebuilding without the consent of the population.⁵⁰ The state needs the population to see it as the legitimate power and an insurgency as criminals, so that it will not support an insurgent networks. The population becomes the center of gravity for a state, and a state sees the population as a critical vulnerability for an insurgency. If a counterinsurgency can remove support from the insurgents, an insurgency will surely wither away. The two sides must battle for support of the population.

Unlike an insurgency, a counterinsurgency cannot simply afford to “not lose.” The state cannot just destroy a particular area or political organization to defeat a rebel movement, because an insurgency can always reorganize and rebuild. One key to victory for the state is permanently isolating an insurgency from the population. This cannot be forced upon the population, but the population itself must actually maintain the conditions of isolation.⁵¹ The population must be ideologically divorced from an insurgency in order to ostracize it. In *Things Fall Apart*, an insurgency’s end game is described as “the size and the operational temp of an insurgency continues to deteriorate at a declining rate until the group finally reaches the point it can no longer pose an organized military challenge.”⁵² In instances where insurgencies have begun to use

48 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3–24 Joint Publications, 2009.

49 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

50 Ibid.

51 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

52 McCormick, Gordon & Horton, Steven & Harrison, Lauren. “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars.” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 327.

natural resources to finance the movement, the national governments will unleash military forces to secure those resources. Eager to maintain its hold or consolidate control, the government will take extreme measures.⁵³ However, in these cases as seen above, an insurgency still relies heavily on the population either for manpower, legitimacy, or the ability to hide. The government still aims to erode the popular support for a rebellion regardless of external support. As an insurgency expends resources to fight the state and it can no longer recharge using the population, then it will be significantly weakened and vulnerable to a counterinsurgency offensive. If a counterinsurgency is able to persuade a population that the rebellion is not a legitimate alternative to the government, then the counter insurgent has seized the initiative. A counterinsurgency seeks to influence the population to this end.

Counterinsurgency operations cannot take a cookie cutter approach to conflicts, because not all insurgencies emerge with the same dynamics. Insurgencies supported by external actors or able to finance themselves change the human dimension to COIN. Pierre Englebert states the following on how resources affect such wars, “Commodities are configured in widely divergent and geographic ways, and these differences will lead to very different war trajectories.”⁵⁴ Other factors such as globalization exacerbates the resource effect on conflict, as improved transportation and communications assist the least sophisticated insurgents.⁵⁵ Despite the level of resource influences on a conflict, the local population plays a significant role in both the eyes of an insurgency and its counterinsurgency. The more one side has support from that population, the more likely it is to succeed over its enemy. Counter insurgencies have many dynamics that can affect the outcome of a conflict, but the population remains a significant key to victory on either side. Whether motivated by greed or grievance, the human dimension within an insurgency driven conflict cannot be ignored.

53 Le Billion, Phillipe. *Fueling War: Resources and Armed Conflicts*. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

54 Englebert, Pierre and Ron, James. “ Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse.” *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 1 (2004): 62.

55 Englebert, Pierre and Ron, James. “ Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse.” *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 1 (2004): 63.

C. STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability Operations are similar to COIN in that these activities can occur throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The U.S. military combines the concept of stability operations with Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR). This section will identify stability operations as all those functions that are seen in SSTR. Stability Operations have the following objective:

[M]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions...The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.⁵⁶

The focus on the population and human aspects of stability operations are easier to identify than that of COIN, because of the nature of stability operations. The main objective of stability operations lies with the local population and focuses on building local, regional and national government capacity. Stability Operations are not confined to combat or post combat environments. These operations can occur across the continuum from peace to crisis to conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or on the verge of collapse due to either man-made or natural disasters. This section will focus on the post conflict aspects of stability operations and the human dynamics involved.

Stability Operations are a strategy that can be used to provide direct assistance in stabilizing a situation and building self-sufficient capacity in the crisis area. According to the U.S. SSTR Joint Operations Concept, the major elements to providing stability, also referred to as mission essential elements (MEE's) are as follows: 1. Establish and maintain a safe and secure environment; 2. Deliver humanitarian assistance; 3. Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; 4. Support economic development; 5. Establish rule of law and effective governance; 6. Conduct strategic

⁵⁶ Bradbury, Mark and Michael Kleinman. *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya* Feinstein International Center, 2010.

communications.⁵⁷ The majority of these tasks are centered on a civilian population, not fighters. For this reason, stability operations are not solely a military effort, but rather one that requires a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, and international assets.⁵⁸ Post conflict environments are inherently complex and full of chaos and disorder. Providing for local populations during such an environment is extremely challenging and cannot be done by one agency or entity alone.⁵⁹ The military represents only one, but essential portion of the overall effort.

Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis challenge the sequential military approach to stability operations in their article, “Winning the Peace.” Using the U.S. experience in Iraq, the authors assert that stability operations are not a sequenced event within the overall spectrum of operations, but can occur simultaneously with other military operations. This concept means that stability operations can be conducted concurrently with COIN operations in an overall strategy. Strictly kinetic operations are not sufficient to defeat an insurgency and the sequential mind-set of providing security before stability operations is not effective.⁶⁰ These authors point to the human dimension by emphasizing the need for non-kinetic operations throughout the full spectrum of operations. Military stability and reconstruction efforts play a vital role within broader construct of a counterinsurgency campaign because it provides time and space for civilian capacity to backfill existing military programs and functions. Reconstruction can occur concurrently with kinetic operations.⁶¹ Mark Ryan, in his article about military reconstruction efforts emphasizes the importance of the local population within stability

57 U.S. Department of Defense. . Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations. 2.0th ed.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

58 U.S. Department of Defense. . Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations. 2.0th ed.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

59 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. “The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations.” *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2005; 2005): 4–17.

60 Collins, Joseph. “Transition Strategy: A Manual for all Seasons.” *Armed Forces Journal* (2009).

61 Ryan, Mick. “The Military and Reconstruction Operations.” *Parameters* (Winter 2007/8, 2007): 60

operations. “The human dimension is the most significant aspect of the environment in which reconstruction operations will be conducted.”⁶²

In the post conflict environment, the drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle. These conditions can continue to deteriorate, and the core grievances and perception of insecurity of the local population intensify. Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can eventually destabilize the entire system.⁶³ Stability Operations can be that countervailing force if it successfully addresses the perceived core grievances and insecurity in a region. When considering the objectives of stability operations in a post conflict environment, the salience of a population is undeniable.

D. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The final type of post conflict operations to be explored is humanitarian assistance (HA). Like Stability Operations, the link to the human dynamic is much easier to see than COIN because of the nature of HA. HA can occur in both combat and non-combat environments. This section will examine the human dimension of HA as a military operation verse international humanitarian assistance efforts. The U.S. military deems these operations as Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) is another way the U.S. military describes HA operations overseas. For the purposes of this study, HA will cover the broad military aspects of HA/DR and FHA. Though multiple agendas within a HA mission can exist, the immediate aim of HA is to prevent and relieve human suffering from either man-made or natural events.⁶⁴ U.S. doctrine uses various forms of HA to train its own troops or achieve specific political objectives. However, the core task of HA is to provide humanitarian assistance.⁶⁵ It is hard to deny the importance and relevance of the

⁶² Ryan, Mick. “The Military and Reconstruction Operations.” *Parameters* (Winter 2007/8, 2007): 63

⁶³ U.S. Department of Defense. . *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations*. 2.0th ed.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

⁶⁴ Diskett, Patricia M. and Tim Randall. “Humanitarian Assistance: A Role for the Military?” *NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace* no. 3 (2001; 2001): 170–170–176.

⁶⁵ “Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (08 July 2008, 2008).

population when the very name of the operation has “humanitarian” in the title. The main focus of HA is the population and those in need, whether the disaster is famine, war, or a tsunami.

Human crises within the post conflict environment are also referred to as complex emergencies. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines such emergencies as follows:

Complex emergencies are situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security environment. Complex emergencies combine internal conflict with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine or food shortage, and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. Often, complex emergencies are also exacerbated by natural disasters.⁶⁶

HA in the post war environment provides many challenges to a military responding; however, the immediate focus of a military is to relieve the suffering of the people. Militaries use civil-military assets to conduct such HA missions, which will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

Within the post conflict phase in the spectrum of operations, a military is forced to conduct a wide variety of operations to address the complexity of the environment. A military can be engaged in COIN, Stability Operations, HA, or any mixture of those operations. One prevailing theme in the three post conflict military operations examined is the salience of the population. In COIN, both insurgents and counterinsurgents fight for influencing the local population for support, enhancing the likelihood of victory. Stability Operations are directly linked to improving or establishing basic services and capacity to a civilian population. And HA is designed to relieve the immediate sufferings of a population affected by a disaster. The human dimension throughout all of these military operations shape the complexity of the environment. Though no post conflict operation looks the same, they are all entrenched with the vast challenges of the human dimension. Human dynamics are demanding obstacles, which a military must negotiate

⁶⁶ Ditzler, Thomas F. “Human Security and Civil-Military Relations in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” *Journal of Human Security* 6, no. 3 (2010; 2010): 1–1–3.

through. Engaging the population is a complex military operation all in itself. A military involved in a post war environment that is able to engage the population and address its perceived grievances will certainly increase its chances of success.

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III. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. WHAT IS CMO?

The purpose of this chapter is to define what civil military operations are and to explain the relevance of CMO in the post conflict environment using accepted CMO theories and doctrine. The previous chapter proved that post conflict military operations such as COIN, stability operations and HA are population centric. These operations all add up to irregular warfare where “the population...becomes the objective.”⁶⁷ This chapter will provide the framework of how a military can engage a civilian population through the use of CMO. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around their area of operations (AO). People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or no impact on military operations.⁶⁸ It is imperative for a military to have the ability to determine whether or not the population will help or hinder operations. As seen in the last chapter, a military seeks to influence the population in a post conflict scenario. CMO activities are tools for a military commander to make those determinations and influences in a complex environment. CMO engagements are a primary military mechanism to synchronize military and non-military instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.⁶⁹ CMO strategies are essential to a military operating in a post conflict environment.

The concept of militaries engaging civilian populations is not new to modern day militaries. European nations, such as Great Britain, France and Belgium found as they expanded into other parts of the world, traditional military techniques were not always adequate when dealing with a new environment. These European nations began to train

⁶⁷ Salmoni, B. and Holmes-Eber, P. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008.

⁶⁸ Department of the Army. “Joint Civil Affairs Operations and Joint Civil-Military Operations Planning Guide.” GTA 41-01-004 (September 2007, 2007).

⁶⁹ “Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (July 2008, 2008).

their soldiers in local cultures and behaviors in order to better engage in the civilian populations.⁷⁰ The United States has a rich history of civil-military engagements, as well. The current U.S. doctrine stems from its post World War II experience that includes but is not limited to operations in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷¹ Large multi-national organizations such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) also developed doctrine and training on executing civil military relations and coordination. Each nation and multi-national organization uses different concepts of CMO because the UN, NATO, EU, and various nations do not always have the same mission sets.⁷²

Each organization not only uses slightly varying concepts of CMO, but they also use different terminology. The U.S. military uses the term CMO that is defined by Joint Publication 3–57 Civil Military Operations as

The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organization and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate overall military operations.⁷³

The U.S. military also distinguishes a difference between CMO and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO is defined by Field Manual 3–05.40 Civil Affairs Operations as

Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by [Civil Affairs] for, through, with or by [Other Government Agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, International Government Agencies, or Non-government Organizations] to modify behaviors, to

70 Salmoni, B. and Holmes-Eber, P. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008.

71 Fishel, J. T. *Civil Military Operations in the New World*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997.

72 de Coning, Cedric. “Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations “ *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 5, no. 2 (February 11, 2006, 2005): 89.

73 Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (July 2008, 2008).

mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO and other U.S. objectives.⁷⁴

By these definitions, CAO are a subset of CMO. Specific forces conduct CAO in order to support the commander's overall CMO strategy within an operational area. CMO engagements are primarily military instruments and are inherent to military commanders' responsibilities.⁷⁵ The U.S. concept of CMO focuses on facilitating overall military objectives. Other organizations do not always focus their civ-mil engagements on the military aspects of an operation, but rather emphasize the humanitarian goals to civ-mil mission.

NATO uses the term Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) to describe the military activities within a civilian population. The Allied Joint Publication-9 (AJP-9) NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine defines CIMIC as

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.⁷⁶

The UN uses both a different term and definition to describe their civil-military missions. UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is defined as

Essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.⁷⁷

One can see by the various definitions that each organization has a particular view of what civil military operations should look like and where the focus lies. Cedric de

⁷⁴ Department of the Army. "Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures." FM3-05-401, (September 2003, 2003).

⁷⁵ Civil-Military Operations." Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (July 2008, 2008).

⁷⁶ Allied Joint Publication. NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, 2003.

⁷⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, 2004.

Coning asserts that the core difference between UN CMCoord and NATO CIMIC is the emphasis on coordination versus cooperation. NATO's verbiage suggests that coordination is the best a military can hope for when conducting CIMIC, while the UN definition looks for a more synchronized effort. Both organizations see coexistence as the minimum standard.⁷⁸ In the same vein, Volker Franke describes the doctrinal differences between CIMIC and the U.S. version of CMO. CIMIC focuses more on the humanitarian principles within an area. Whereas CMO focus on the military needs and how to gain support from a civilian population in order to meet a specific military objective.⁷⁹

CMO, CIMIC, CAO, and CMCoord all overlap functionally with nuanced differences in each concept. It is important to understand the various distinctions that each organization or nation brings with the concept of civil-military engagements. Because civil-military operations mean different things to different organizations, the precise definition of CMO needs be clear in the context of this study. This study will use the CMO concept as based on U.S. military doctrine where the focus of CMO is as military tool used to achieve military needs. The U.S. definition of CMO pertains to the next chapter's UPDF case study because the UPDF is a partnered force with the United States and received CMO specific training from the U.S..⁸⁰ With the definition of CMO clearly outlined, the next section will examine how CMO should be integrated within a wide scope of post conflict operations.

It is important to note that the U.S. doctrine specifically addresses CMO activities that occur in foreign nations. U.S. military units do not conduct CMO projects on U.S. territory, except for extremely rare occasions when the U.S. military assists civil authorities in disaster relief. These cases are not outlined in the U.S. military doctrine

⁷⁸ de Coning, Cedric. "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 5, no. 2 (February 11, 2006, 2005): 89.

⁷⁹ Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 8.

⁸⁰ Habati, M. A. "U.S.-Uganda Joint Military Training Ends." Ugpulse.Com (21 April 2011, 2011), <http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/news.asp?about=joint+military+exercise+between+Uganda+and+U.S.+flaggedoff&ID=18999> (accessed 02/05/2011).

and are addressed through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).⁸¹ When U.S. forces apply CMO strategies, the U.S. is a third party force assisting in host nation capacity building.⁸² The principles seen in the CMO framework are designed to enhance state capacity. The next section will outline that framework in detail. If CMO framework is meant to increase a host nation's ability to govern then it is assumed that if that government adheres to those same concepts without a third-party, then CMO doctrine should be adequate for domestic use. The Northern Uganda case study will show what implications if any exist when a military conducts CMO missions on its own soil.

B. CMO FRAMEWORK

In a post conflict environment, cooperation between civilians and military elements involve integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response. This section will discuss the general framework for implementing CMO. Civilian and military actors share the common goals of promoting security and creating conditions to transition back to stable structures.⁸³ At times, CMO may require military forces to perform tasks usually the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities can occur before, during or after other military operations.⁸⁴ CMO can be incorporated into a variety of post conflict operations, but can also be a stand-alone operation. The complexity of a post conflict environment requires that all levels of military and civilian assets work together to accomplish the same objectives.

1. CMO Functions

The goal of CMO is not just minimizing civilian interference in military operations, but it is a tool to hasten an end to hostilities and attempt to limit collateral

⁸¹ "Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5. Office of the Press Secretary the White House. February 28, 2003.

⁸² "Civil-Military Operations." Joint Publication 3-57 JP 3-57, (08 July 2008, 2008).

⁸³ de Coning, Cedric. "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 5, no. 2 (February 11, 2006, 2005): 89.

⁸⁴ Department of the Army "Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures" FM 3-05.401, (September 2003, 2003).

damage on a local population from offensive, defensive or stability operations.⁸⁵ While the use of CMO is meant to help bring an end to conflict, it is also an essential tool throughout the entire range for military operations. The U.S. Joint Operations Doctrine uses phases 0 –V to describe the range of military operations. The phases are as follows: Phase 0-Shape, Phase I- Deter, Phase II- Seize Initiative, Phase III- Dominate, Phase IV- Stabilize and Phase V- Enable Civil Authority.⁸⁶ CMO activities play a critical role in each of these phases as outlined by the Joint Field Manual 3–57. During Phase 0, timely use of CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. By shaping the conditions before conflict occurs through civil-military engagements, a military can possibly avert the crisis all together. In Phase I, CMO missions are a source of soft power to influence the population and avoid using kinetic military power. By deterring the population away from an insurgency or violence, CMO can minimize the use of military coercion. CMO actions in Phase II are used to down grade the enemy capability. Population and resource control are implemented during this phase to limit resources to the enemy force. During Phase III the bulk of combat operations occur; minimizing civilian interference on the battlefield is a primary function of CMO. Phase IV CMO plans focus on humanitarian relief, civil order and restoration of public goods. In this phase, the majority of combat operations ceased and post conflict activities begin. Finally, Phase V CMO missions emphasize the rehabilitation or restoration of civil-sector functions.⁸⁷ Each phase of combat operations has a particular role for integrated CMO efforts from shaping operations to the restoration of civil authority.

Just as CMO integration is seen in the full spectrum of operations, its applications are in every level of warfare from tactical to strategic.⁸⁸ Strategic CMO planners look at the larger long-term regional issues to include economic development, reconstruction and stability. On the operational scale, CMO actions focus on near term issues such as health

⁸⁵ Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (July 2008, 2008).

⁸⁶ Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (July 2008, 2008).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations:

services, food and human security. Finally, at the tactical level CMO missions promote legitimacy and gain support from the local population.⁸⁹ A military can gain popular support by conducting ground level CMO projects. These CMO projects provide an opportunity for the military to achieve good public relations (PR) through helping local communities. The implications of civil military coordination and operations impact the broad scale of military operations at each level of employment.

John Fishel, in his book Civil Military Operations in the New World, describes three distinct pillars commanders use to develop a CMO strategy at any level of warfare. He uses the concept of ends, ways and means to break down effective CMO implementation. The ends can vary at each level of warfare, but need to culminate into a national objective. This pillar implies that unity of effort is needed from tactical, operational and strategic level planning. The ways are defined as the concept of operations for civil-military engagements. This pillar concentrates on the interagency coordination that must occur during CMO planning and execution. Again, Fishel emphasizes the concept of unifying and synchronizing efforts. And finally the means are defined as the resources used to achieve the tasks outlined by the first two pillars. The means come in the form of either massing forces or using the economy of force in order to execute the mission.

According to military doctrine, CMO strategy must be well coordinated at all levels from the tactical to the strategic level just like any other major military operation, because it is a military operation. The overarching theme that runs through each pillar is unity of effort.⁹⁰ CMO doctrine assumes that all of the parties will work together in unison to achieve a consolidated objective. CMO emerging as a harmonized endeavor does not always occur in practice. Military objects drive CMO. This is problematic when the military has its own agendas and objective that do not synchronize with the goals of civilian organizations. Though CMO projects can be an important piece in the overall post conflict reconstruction, it can also cause inconsistency amongst the overall

89 Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (July 2008, 2008).

90 Fishel, J. T. *Civil Military Operations in the New World*. Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1997.

efforts. Just because an operation is called “CMO” does not mean it is the silver bullet to solve all the post conflict reconstruction woes. If it is not properly employed CMO projects can hinder the overall efforts just as much as it can help.

Many people, to include military commanders, associate CMO as “feel good” activities. CMO objectives accomplish nothing if it is not nested within larger military goals. CMO operators are soldiers, not humanitarians. The distinction can be difficult to make if the goals of the CMO campaign are not outlined from the onset. Most people naturally desire to help fellow human beings in need. CMO planners can be lured into the trap of “just wanting to make a difference” or “just wanting to help.” But CMO activities are not designed to only help all those who are suffering, but are meant to attack specific military objectives, such as influencing a population or creating an economic environment that promotes trade in a specific village.

Even when government agencies are able to coordinate with the military, the process can be long and tedious. A primary example of how extensive bureaucratic processes can be comes from the Combine Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Enforcing extensive guidelines to ensure maximum cooperation between the civilian and military actors occurs actually hampered progress with the CJTF-HOA CMO projects out of Djibouti. According to Professor Jessica Piombo,

Any project ... requires approval by three separate authorities—by the civil-military operations shop at the headquarters in Djibouti, by the Humanitarian Assistance branch of USAFRICOM, and by the U.S. embassy in each country. The purpose of this review is to ensure that the nominated project meets the goals of the humanitarian assistance program and that it is coordinated with the U.S. embassy and its programs and goals.⁹¹

This illustrates the difficulties that occur even when government agencies are attempting to work together. CMO operators and the local governments become frustrated with the exaggerated timelines for seemingly simple projects. Even in the

⁹¹ Piombo, Jessica. *Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa*, 2010.

most conducive environments, CMO undertakings are inherently complex and must contend with multiple organizational personalities.

CMO is not the sole means or even the most valuable way to fix humanitarian problems in complex emergencies, but when used effectively it can achieve deliberate military objectives. Specifically, in situations where security provisions are required, the military becomes the logical partner. A military can provide protection for other reconstruction efforts. Also, the mission oriented mind-set of a military can be harnessed in the overall post conflict efforts. Militaries are quick to mobilize and make “things happen.” In Afghanistan, U.S. forces used the military to conduct “quick impact” projects to bridge the gap while other development agencies focused on long-term economic goals.⁹² Using CMO capabilities in the context of a military mission, but concurrently allowing that mission to benefit the overall development piece is the balance that military planners should attain.

The post conflict environment is ripe with crises and potential crises; actors from a multitude of organizations are involved with providing security, alleviating suffering, promoting governance and rule of law. Even when all these characters do agree on the same set of goals, coordination and integration proves to be difficult and flawed. But many times the main actors involved in post conflict scenarios do not agree on the most basic issues. For example, should the military even be involved? The following section will briefly outline some of the discourse surrounding CMO and the proposed solutions to those issues.

2. CMO Dilemmas

The use of CMO has its critics. Though the mission of CMO is defined as a commander’s instrument to obtain military objectives, not all military actors support the concept of military led engagements. Some military leaders prefer not to conduct CMO and only take on the task when it is a military necessity or required by political entities. In the U.S. experience, military reluctance to become involved in low intensity conflicts

⁹² Franke, Volker. “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 15.

can be traced back to Vietnam. Many senior officers felt that CMO and other non-kinetic activities distract from the military's core mission, which is to win wars and fight the nation's battles.⁹³ This hesitation followed the U.S. military all the way to post war reconstruction in Iraq in 2003. Military leaders were pushed into conducting reconstruction because of a lack of civilian alternatives.⁹⁴ Though the U.S. has civilian components dedicated to promoting development and post conflict reconstruction, such as USAID and the Department of State, many countries do not have the capacity to create such stand alone agencies. It is many times the case; a nation's military is the only government institution strong enough and with the ability or funding to operate in post conflict environments.

Even in nations who have robust civilian organizations the military at times becomes the default tool to conduct post conflict reconstruction missions. In the U.S. example, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan the mindset of the top leadership felt that "if you break it; you buy it." This indicated that if the military conducted combat operations then it would be required to fix what it "broke." New doctrine emerged from the Department of Defense to expound upon the complexity of post war issues that challenged the military. One such doctrine is the Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction. Through experience and lessons learned, the U.S. military perception of post conflict issues evolved to become more inclusive.⁹⁵ This example of evolving doctrine and mindset concerning the role of CMO in a post conflict can be used by other militaries on how to address the reluctance to embrace the concept.

While military leaders can be hesitant to take on CMO missions, civilian components involved in post conflict reconstruction are at times unwilling to work with military components, as well. Some humanitarians fear that working with the military will make efforts become military centric. There have been several debates surrounding

93 Patrick, Stewart. "A Return to Realism? the United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11." *International PeaceKeeping* 15, no. 1 (February 2008, 2008): 141.

94 Shadlow, Nadia. "War and the Art of Governance." *Parameters* (Autumn 2003, 2003): pp.88–90.

95 Patrick, Stewart. "A Return to Realism? the United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11." *International PeaceKeeping* 15, no. 1 (February 2008, 2008): 140.

the use of CMO in the post conflict environment by non-military organizations. For instance, NGOs see a potential for CMO to undermine the impartial nature of humanitarian aid. NGOs fear that militaries use humanitarian assistance to gain trust, access, placement and intelligence. Conflicting with impartiality can cause confusion amongst the population and undermine the NGOs' own mission. These concerns led to the concept of "humanitarian space," where military involvement only comes in the worst emergencies.⁹⁶ Even the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) makes a point to maintain a clear separation between the military and humanitarian roles in complex emergencies. The concept of humanitarian space allows for military and humanitarian actors to operate within their own spheres of responsibility.⁹⁷

While NGOs are sometimes unwilling to share humanitarian space with a military, they can provide a unique and important perspective to CMO operators. NGOs have a unique standpoint when engaging a local population because of the time they spend in an area typically supersedes the time of any military force operating in that region. NGOs often do more than provide basic needs to suffering populations, but also are able to bring together conflicting parties. Enhancing the ability of local NGOs and ensuring their security in hostile or non-friendly areas are a precondition to successful CMO.⁹⁸ Using NGOs or information from NGOs can allow a military to maintain a good relationship with the local population and gain an intimate understanding of the culture. By setting the right tone through NGOs, a military's chance of successful civil-military engagements increases.

Volker Franke makes several recommendations on how civilians and military actors in the post conflict environment can work together effectively. Military and civilian planners should create a division of labor that exploits organizations'

96 Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 12.

97 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, 2004.

98 Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 8.

“comparative advantage.” For a military the tasks can include providing security, logistic capabilities, organization, discipline and a sense of mission accomplishment. For the civilian sector, the tasks could include technical expertise, networking NGOS and IGOs, detailed knowledge of the AO and long-term relationships with the local population. By using a comparative advantage model for CMO, military and civilian actors complement each other verses competing with each other.⁹⁹ In order to succeed, both the humanitarian and military aspects to post conflict operations must be taught to civilians and military personnel. Training post conflict organizations about each other’s capabilities will identify strengths and weakness in civilian and military elements. Knowing where the gaps exist makes it possible to address them.

The final CMO challenge is posed by apparent organizational culture differences between humanitarian and the military actors. Most humanitarian organizations are a horizontal structure, making simultaneous lateral decisions. On the other hand a military is much more hierarchical, central in planning and a top down organization. Most militaries train their personnel to coordinate, while humanitarian employees emphasize self-reliance in their areas of expertise.¹⁰⁰ This disparity in organizational culture can cause confusion where in the planning process the decisions are made.¹⁰¹ These issues can be addressed through interagency training, as mentioned earlier. Eric James puts the onus of training on military components verses the humanitarian actors because militaries are typically better funded and more heavily manned than nongovernmental organizations. NGOs are small and do not usually have enough resources (both human and financial) to attend multiple training sessions and conferences.¹⁰² Despite who shoulders the training responsibility, both civilian and military planners need to become

99 Franke, Volker. “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 18.

100 Eisenhower, J. H. and Edward Marks. “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations.” *Joint Force Quarterly* : JFQ 22, (Summer 1999, 1999): 86.

101 James, Eric. “Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghansitan and Iraq.” *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (October 2003, 2003).

102 James, Eric. “Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghansitan and Iraq.” *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (October 2003, 2003).

familiar with each other's operations. Training, education and communication are essential to addressing the culture clash between humanitarian and military actors in the post conflict environment.

Another inherent cultural difference is that the core missions of military and humanitarian organizations are respectively at odds with each other. The military is there to win wars. The humanitarian is there to alleviate suffering. These missions do overlap in a post conflict environment and both elements become population centric. The military seeks to provide security and a safe environment for post conflict operations. Through security, humanitarian actors are given space to administer aid and other assistance. Without security, civilian actors may be unable to complete the relief mission. A military's ability to provide security is a lynch pin in complex post conflict environments.¹⁰³ During the post conflict phases IV and V of military operations, both humanitarian and military missions work to the same end instead of contradict each other.

The debates surrounding military involvement in post conflict issues are valid, but through proper communication between military and non-military actors these concerns can be mitigated to some degree of cooperation. This is not to say that the discourse surrounding using a military to nation build will cease, but communication can close the gap. The organizational differences and bureaucratic infighting will always exist between the military and its civilian counterparts. However, if CMO planners are able to identify these issues, then some of the competitiveness and challenges of Civilian-Military coordination can be avoided. By identifying humanitarian space, training military actors, effectively using NGO knowledge, CMO engagement benefit all parties involved in post conflict operations, not just the military.

The military brings a remarkable amount of capability to a crisis. They can have an effective means to deliver assistance, deploy a large number of personnel and equipment in a short time frame. A military can provide resources, protection, logistic

¹⁰³ James, Eric. "Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq." *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (October 2003, 2003).

supplies, information, communication and various services to crisis situations.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, humanitarian actors bring a certain level of expertise when it comes to identifying vulnerabilities in a population.¹⁰⁵ Finding the comparative advantage for military and humanitarian actors is essential to facilitating successful CMO activities. Training and communication allows for a common understanding for those involved in post conflict operations. Understanding the definition of CMO and how it works within the phases of operations is essential to that interagency dialogue. The following sections will provide more depth examination of the role of CMO within COIN and stability operations.

C. CMO IN COIN

Academics and military strategists write about the salience of CMO and non-kinetic operations when conducting counterinsurgency operations. During an insurgency-based conflict, both an insurgency and its counterinsurgency seek support from the population. CMO is how a military is able to engage and eventually influence that population. For a counterinsurgent force, it is no longer sufficient to think in purely kinetic terms. Executing traditionally focused combat operations and concentrating on training local security forces works, but this is only a short-term solution. In the long term, only focusing on combat and developing combat forces can hinder true progress while promoting the growth of insurgent forces working against campaign objectives. Attacking an insurgency by only kinetic means is a lopsided approach.¹⁰⁶ In this construct, COIN operations require a non-kinetic element.

Field manual 3-57 states, “CMO support to COIN is depriving the insurgents of their ‘greatest weapon’ a dissatisfied population.”¹⁰⁷ Of the core CMO tasks, population and resource control becomes the most salient during COIN. Using CMO, a military can

104 Eisenhower, J. H. and Edward Marks. “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations.” *Joint Force Quarterly* : JFQ 22, (Summer 1999, 1999): 86.

105 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, 2004.

106 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. “The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations.” *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2005; 2005): 4–4–17.

107 Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (July 2008, 2008).

starve an insurgency, limiting both resources and exposure to the population. Population control provides security for the population and at the same time denies availability of personnel to enemy forces. Resource control regulates movement or consumption of materials and denies an insurgency access to those materials. Integrating CMO activities can effectively isolate the insurgents from the population, which is a key tactic in COIN operations.

COIN theorist David Killcullen provides a “how to” guide for CMO in counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. He asserts that the unit should start with addressing the basic needs within a local population and slowly move up Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. He states, “Counterinsurgency is armed social work: an attempt to redress back social and political problems while being shot at.”¹⁰⁸ Killcullen makes pertinent assertions about conducting CMO at a tactical level using the U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a COIN environment, there is no such thing as impartiality. Every time a military helps someone, it is hurting someone else at the same time. In this respect, the goal should be to help the population and hurt the insurgency by limiting its resources.¹⁰⁹

CMO missions include military led reconstruction operations. These projects require precise, discriminate application of non-kinetic efforts to support the campaign plan in an effort to defeat current and future insurgencies.¹¹⁰ Such operations require synchronization between military assets and other civilian components. Military reconstruction operations play a vital role within broader concept of a counterinsurgency campaign.¹¹¹ CMO efforts provide time and space for civilian capacity to backfill existing military programs and functions. Reconstruction can occur concurrently with kinetic operations. Killcullen makes recommendations on what projects a COIN force

108 Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.

109 Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.

110 Ryan, Mick. “The Military and Reconstruction Operations.” *Parameters* (Winter 2007/8, 2007): 59.

111 Ryan, Mick. “The Military and Reconstruction Operations.” *Parameters* (Winter 2007/8, 2007): 60.

should look to provide. Outside of providing basic needs, projects should be small and manageable relative to the unit. Large, long-term projects are hard to manage while conducting concurrent COIN operations.¹¹²

While on the tactical level, CMO should look to address the immediate needs of a local population, there are large-scale impacts of a military assuming roles typically performed by civilians. David Galula warns that as a military assumes major government roles, there is a temptation for it to take over all government activities including politics. Those implementing COIN strategy should seek civilian alternatives whenever possible. Insurgencies stem from political problems and the solution should be primarily political, not military in nature.¹¹³

Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies battle for influence over the population. A military seeks to remove the insurgency from the population and any popular support for the insurgency. The counterinsurgent force needs a tool to engage with the population. CMO engagements are the instrument to help a military achieve its COIN objectives. A CMO strategy is pertinent to COIN operations because in this environment the population is the center of gravity.

D. CMO IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Just as in COIN, CMO strategy is essential to stability operations. Stability operations aim to establish conditions that support the “transition to legitimate...governance, a functional civil society, and viable market economy.”¹¹⁴ Like COIN and CMO, stability operations are not easily defined and typically require forces to simultaneously conduct kinetic and non-kinetic operations. It is no longer acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations simply by first

¹¹² Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.

¹¹³ Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

¹¹⁴ Department of the Army. *Stability Operations*: U.S. Department of Defense, 2009.

establishing a secure environment.¹¹⁵ COIN, stability operations and CMO can all occur simultaneously. Many of the principles found in the application of CMO during COIN apply in stability operations as well.

CMO has three major functions in stability operations. Those functions are as follows: coordinate between military and civilian actors in the area of operation, assist the civilians within that environment, and support the commander/force.¹¹⁶ First, CMO is used to coordinate both military and civilian organizations. Synchronizing all combat and non-combat powers to achieve a singular objective is essential to the definition of CMO. The same principle applies when CMO is used during stabilization activities as all entities strive for transition to a competent government and able economy. The second function of CMO within stability operations is to assist in preparing the environment for stabilization to occur, which means securing the environment to facilitate transition. Securing the environment has two steps, establishing a safe environment and managing the immediate consequences of the conflict. Establishing that secure environment includes minimizing the opportunities for criminals and others who benefit from the chaos. These conflict opportunists are referred to as spoilers.¹¹⁷ Finally, the CMO campaign must support the objectives stated by the commander conducting stability operations. The emphasis on this function is that CMO engagements must all add up in support of the stabilization forces.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a clear and concise definition of CMO. The focus of CMO in a post conflict environment is achieving military objectives in support of overall operations. The framework outlined by CMO doctrine emphasizes that a unity of effort must exist between military and non-military elements. In order to obtain coordination,

¹¹⁵ Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. "The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2005; 2005): 4–17.

¹¹⁶ Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 8.

¹¹⁷ de Coning, Cedric. "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 5, no. 2 (February 11, 2006, 2005): 89.

cooperation or synchronization from all elements of national power, CMO planning is required in complex environments. CMO missions occur at every level of operations and at every phase in the spectrum of warfare. CMO strategies should be planned and executed like any other military operation, integrating the objectives in to an entire campaign plan.

Civilians and military actors will always work in the same space in a post conflicts situation. Though civilian and humanitarian components have various goals and missions, these objectives can be aligned with a military mission. Through training and open communication by stakeholders, the civilian and military actors can reach a point of comparative advantage in the complex environment. Teaching and education is essential to bridging the disparities amongst humanitarian works and military components.

CMO engagements are critically important to COIN operations. By maximizing the concept of population and resource control, CMO operators can isolate an insurgency. Through active reconstruction and projects, a military can bring legitimacy to the state and dissuade a population from an insurgency. COIN actions are about winning the population over. A CMO strategy can focus in those activities and provide a way for meaningful engagements by a counterinsurgent force. Within stability operations, CMO principles remain the same as in COIN. By using the fundamentals of CMO, civilian and military stabilization efforts are harmonized. The military is able to fill gaps in security, logistics and services that a civilian force needs. At the same time, the civilian sector brings expertise, detailed understanding of culture and humanitarian principles to the transition efforts. CMO strategy is relevant to post conflict activities because of many challenges posed by the human element in that environment. The following chapters will provide an in depth case study that will test the theoretical framework concerning CMO in the post conflict environment. Using post conflict Northern Uganda and the civil-military engagements conducted by the UPDF, this study will determine if the excepted theories concerning CMO hold true in a real world scenario.

IV. NORTHERN UGANDA

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT

The past three chapters have examined the post conflict environment, identified the military operations that occur in that environment and the relevance of CMO within the post conflict construct. The next two chapters will be an in depth case study examining the real world application of accepted post conflict civil military operations theory. The focus of this chapter is to study the conflict in Northern Uganda from 1986 to 2006. By examining the root causes and evolution of the conflict, one can better understand the complexities and dynamics that exist in a post conflict Northern Uganda. The active conflict between the LRA and the government of Uganda lasted twenty years. Once the LRA fled to southern Sudan in 2006 and dispersed in the surrounding countries, major combat operations in Uganda ceased. This chapter will examine the events that took place in Uganda up to 2006.

The disparity between Northern Uganda and the rest of the country can be traced back much further than the LRA. This chapter will explore the historical origins of the north-south division starting with the colonial period. Next, postcolonial dynamics will be examined, by studying the regimes and the rebellions that occurred after independence. The last era to be explored is the Museveni regime and the effects that his rise to power had on the population in the north. Once the historical background has been established, the emergence of the LRA and their tactics will be examined in detail. This section will argue that the LRA's insurgency rose from the political and economic grievances in the north. At the onset the LRA represented a large portion of the northern population, but as external support fueled the rebellion, the LRA's tactics veered away from focusing on population-centric strategies. Losing the population's support drove the LRA to use intensely coercive tactics. Once the LRA had alienated a majority of the populous, mostly by its own hand, the LRA stagnated as a movement and eventually fled Uganda. It was never able amass enough military force directly confront the UPDF or topple the government. Failing to gain popular support, in the end, the LRA was never able to achieve its ultimate political agenda of removing the Museveni government.

The final section will outline how the UPDF responded to the LRA tactics in the north. The Ugandan military adopted multiple counterinsurgency strategies during the conflict, such as attempts to isolate the insurgency from the population, heavy-handed tactics to intimidate the population, and aggressive offensive actions. This section will look at the evolution of the UPDF from its start as the National Resistance Army (NRA) and how it engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the north. This section will determine that interactions between the LRA and UPDF were based in violence, fear, and combat-centric engagements. From 1996–2006, neither party attempted to win over the population, instead both sides chose strategies of coercion and fear to influence the northern population. This chapter will illustrate that in the struggle between the LRA and the UPDF, the welfare of the population was never a major concern for either party. That ambivalence had an effect on post conflict Uganda. By examining the origins and progression of the conflict and its impact on the population, one can determine the complex challenges the UPDF faced in their post conflict operations.

B. NORTHERN UGANDA’S BACKGROUND

The story of Northern Uganda’s violent conflict began with British colonization. Much of the political structures in which ethnic groups interact today are a direct result of the systems that Great Britain created.¹¹⁸ Uganda was given to Great Britain as a colony under the Berlin Congress of 1884. Under British rule, the Buganda Agreement of 1900 placed the Bantu tribespeople of the south as the superior ethnic group over the northern tribes, and laid the foundations for an enduring north-south economic and political divide that took on ethnic dimensions.¹¹⁹ These British induced divisions eventually led to the south and east dominating the economic and political sectors of government, while the north was able to gain control of the military. These regional divisions morphed into ethnic cleavages that would splinter the country at independence.

118 Kisekka-Ntale, Fredrick. “Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda.” *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 32, no. 4 (2007): 421–452.

119 Kisekka-Ntale, Fredrick. “Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda.” *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 32, no. 4 (2007): 421–452.

British policies intentionally enhanced the southern Baganda's of the Bantu tribes, economic position in the country by establishing a cash crop economy in the south. The British introduced crops to the south such as cotton, cocoa, rubber and coffee to spur the economic growth. The south and east became productive zones due to their agricultural economies, while the north was left to find other means for economic growth.¹²⁰ The north was viewed as a pool of farm workers and other human capital. Because the south was more prosperous, the north began to depend on the state to provide jobs. Both the Acholi and Langi are sub-tribes to the largest ethnic group in the north, the Lou. The Lou were traditionally referred to as warriors in their pre-colonial history. The British combined the notion that the northerners were a "warrior-class" with the concept of the region was the country's labor pool and filled the ranks of its security forces with Acholi and Langi.¹²¹ By the time of independence, the Acholi found themselves dominating the military ranks with a political identity rooted deeply in their ethnicity.¹²²

Thus, by the end of the colonial era, the seeds for subsequent conflict had been sown. The south had grown economically prosperous excelling in politics and developing their economy, while the north had become overly represented in the military. The Bantu tribes were more centrally organized, which made the natural choice for civil servants. The Bantu saw themselves as superior to their northern counter parts, regarding those in the north as "banamawanga," meaning foreigners.¹²³ Ethnic identities had begun to crystallize around these distinctions as well as the ambition for more political control from the north. Thus, when independence was granted in 1962, the nation was ripe for a confrontation between the military power on the one hand, and the economically and politically elite, on the other.

120 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

121 Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

122 Kisekka-Ntale, Fredrick. "Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda." *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 32, no. 4 (2007): 421–452.

123 Ibid.

The Acholi people identified themselves as a separate ethnic group as a consequence of the British rule. The ethnonym, Acholi did not even exist until the twentieth century. Up until 1930s, the Acholi were referred to as Gangi or Shul, who traditionally raised cattle and farmed. Acholi stems from the word “An-loco-li” meaning simply “I am a human being.”¹²⁴ Creating ethnic divisions were a part of the colonizers’ grand economic strategy. The British successfully maintained control of its colony through a classic divide and rule strategy – they developed internal boundaries that separated groups, created new communities, and limited interethnic movements. Both the north and south bought into their new ethnic identities and maintained them into the postcolonial period.

The first prime minister of Uganda was Milton Obote, who only deepened the north-south divisions by surrounding his administration with a patron network that supported Northern Uganda. Obote was removed by a military coup led by Idi Amin, another northerner, in 1971. Under Obote, the predominantly-Acholi Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) took over the government.¹²⁵ By the late 1970s and early 1980s southerners began to mobilize under the premise that they needed to end the series of northern dictatorships. Yoweri Museveni led a rebel army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) against the ruling UNLA.

The NRA was the crucible in which the north-south divide became ethnically engineered and this political battle took place at a national level.¹²⁶ Uganda plunged into a civil war with the UNLA representing the north and the NRA fighting for the south. Museveni and his top commanders were Bayankole, a Bantu sub-tribe from southwestern Uganda. But large contingents of the NRA were Banyarwanda, Rwandan refugees, which comprised up to 3,000 of the 14,000 NRA troops. The NRA decided to base their operations in an area called the Luwero Triangle. Luwero is located in southern Uganda

124 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

125 Branch, A. “Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland.” Chap. 1, *In The Lord’s Resistance Army Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

126 Ibid.

and had a heterogeneous population of Baganda, another Bantu subtribe, peasants and Banyarwanda migrant workers. The NRA insurgency had the inherent challenge of mobilizing the Luwero population to support the rebel army. Museveni appealed to the populous by presenting the rebellion in regional terms as a struggle for the south to overthrow the north; this concept carried with it ethnic connotations of the Bantu and Nilotic, another major southern tribe.¹²⁷ Uganda was in a full-fledged civil war.

By 1984, the UNLA had made little progress fighting the NRA in the Luwero Triangle. Knowing that the densely populated Luwero was not only the base of operations for the NRA, but also where the NRA had achieved most of its popular support, the UNLA launched a massive attack in Luwero, called Operation Bonanza. As a part of this military operation, the UNLA massacred civilians and soldiers indiscriminately. Operation Bonanza led to more than 300,000 deaths. The Acholi dominated army was widely held responsible for the mass killings.¹²⁸ The legacy of Luwero would haunt the Acholi population for many years after the massacre and become a decisive factor for the emergence of insurgent groups seeking redemption.

With Luwero as a glaring example of northern cruelty, Museveni and his NRM were able to mobilize more of the south under a banner of regionalism. The NRM was able to gain enough popular support to build an army large enough to defeat the UNLA. In 1986, the NRM successfully won the war and took over control of the central government. The Acholi population in particular took the brunt of the anti-north sentiment because it was so over represented in the army. After his victory over the UNLA, Museveni was sworn in to the office of the President. The Acholi instantly felt the backlash of losing the war.¹²⁹ The new President immediately removed the Acholi elites from power and dissolved any link between the north and the central government.

127 Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

128 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

129 Finnstrom, S. "Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord's Resistance Movement/Army in Uganda." *Journal of International African Institute* 76, no. No. 2 (2006): 200.

The new government also launched a massive preemptive effort with harsh counterinsurgency-like tactics in Northern Uganda in order to squash any attempted Acholi counter rebellion. The efforts were unsuccessful; rebel movements began to rise from the disenfranchised population in the north. These insurgencies attempted to bring order to the Acholi society by building a constituency against the new ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM).¹³⁰ The NRA continued to launch aggressive campaigns in the north to quell the uprisings. During this time frame, the NRA viewed the entire northern population as the enemy and did not distinguish between civilian and rebel. The more brutal the NRA tactics became, the more the resistance grew. Each time a rebel movement was defeated, a new group formed and absorbed the remnants of the defeated.¹³¹

At the same time as the Acholi were being repressed and excluded from the government; they also felt that the new regime did not protect them against economic predation from other northern groups. While Museveni's forces were focused on disarming the Acholi and Langi in the north, cattle raiders from another northern region, called Karamojong, had gone largely ignored. The Karamojong and Acholi have a traditionally hostile relationship with each other. In 1987, the Karamojong were able to secure weapons from the capital, Kampala, for "self defense" purposes. Some speculate this was an intentional move on the NRM's part to weaken its opposition in the north. Massive raids on the cattle in the Gulu and Kitgum districts, home to the Acholi, were the result of newly armed Karamojong raiders. The districts lost approximately \$25 million from the raids, which was devastating in an economy already ruined by the war. The Acholi felt the government turned a blind eye to the raids, which was destroying the economy in the districts of Gulu and Kitgum.¹³²

130 Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

131 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

132 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

Thus, within a few years of the Museveni regime coming into power, grievances towards the central government were high in the face of a defeated UNLA and an economy that was being torn apart. From these sentiments, the first true insurgency rose from the north, the Ugandan People's Defense Army (UPDA). The UPDA developed with the sole goal of returning power back to the north and defeating the NRA. Though the UPDA and the NRA fought in several skirmishes, by June of 1988 the UPDA surrendered and signed a peace deal with the Museveni government.¹³³ Yet the struggles of the northerners were far from over. As the UPDA was fading, a new movement was rising- the Holy Spirit Movement, led by Alice Lakwena Walker.

Lakwena brought something new to the Acholi population — she offered them a chance for spiritual redemption. Lakwena convinced her followers that she could purify the deeds that the Acholi committed in the past such as the Luwero massacres when they were a part of the UNLA. Part of this purification included a violent rebellion against the NRA.¹³⁴ By purging not only Acholiland, but also all of Uganda, the Acholi could make amends for what had occurred during the civil war. The Holy Spirit Movement combined spirituality with the already existing grievances towards the government. Her claim to spiritual authority resonated with the Acholi population and she was able to assemble an army of 7,000–10,000 followers.¹³⁵ Alice Lakwena was an unsuccessful military commander with no tactical or operational proficiency. She relied too heavily on the spiritual aspects of her cause verses using proven military techniques. One example was that she convinced her followers rubbing holy oil on the body would protect them from bullets when engaging in combat operations. The Holy Spirit Movement's inability to produce a military victory eventually led to its defeat by 1989. From the rubble of the failed insurgency, another movement emerged, the Lord's Resistance Army.

133 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

134 Finnstrom, S. *Living with Bad Surroundings*. NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

135 Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

When Lakwena was defeated, some of her members shifted to the LRA, led by Joseph Kony. Kony, too, claimed to have supernatural abilities. Joseph Kony was able to maximize his movement by claiming he was the successor to Alice Lakwena and able to communicate with many spirits including the Holy Spirit. He also used Acholi traditions to gain legitimacy by claiming that his elders blessed him to fight Museveni.¹³⁶ Kony's charismatic leadership attracted a population who as a whole and as individuals felt despair. Like his predecessor, Kony focused on the spiritual aspects of his movement. He combined old Acholi traditions with new rituals, and fed on feelings of grievance and desperation to shore up his following. Through Kony's leadership, the LRA was able wage a war with the government in Northern Uganda for over twenty years. The next section will discuss the nature of the LRA and its tactics.

C. THE LRA

The LRA has morphed over the years from a strong insurgency to a decentralized organization spread throughout the Great Lakes Region in Central Africa. The LRA's political agenda to overthrow the Museveni government and use of violence make it by definition an insurgency. Though many mainstream media portray Joseph Kony as an insane cult leader, his group was in fact rational and acted in its own self-interest. This section will show how the LRA has evolved over the past twenty-five years and how the group used fear and violence to achieve its immediate goals. The vicious tactics of the LRA has captured the attention of the international community because of the seemingly indiscriminate use of violence. However, these methods of coercion were a calculated means for the LRA to survive and cause chaos in Northern Uganda.

The spiritual order of the LRA gave the organization a perceived legitimacy among its members on a level higher than the political plane. The LRA's beliefs and practices served rational and functional purposes in the operations of the group. Through these spiritual beliefs the LRA was able to exert control.¹³⁷ Kony took advantage of the

¹³⁶ Finnstrom, S. "Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord's Resistance Movement/Army in Uganda." *Journal of International African Institute* 76, no. No. 2 (2006): 200.

¹³⁷ Titeca, K. "The Spiritual Order of the LRA." Chap. 3, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

deep spiritualism of the Acholi, embedding spirituality in the movement to serve as a functional purpose. Kony purposed himself as the “bearer of an apocalyptic vision.”¹³⁸ This vision was the widely expected view that the Acholi people were on the brink of genocide. The only way to avoid this future was a total moral rejuvenation. Kony was able to combine fear and a need for salvation to gain spiritual authority. The spiritual order of the LRA served as a way to guarantee internal cohesion. Joseph Kony tied the notion of absolute obedience to the spiritual rules as the only way to survive life in the bush. Joseph Kony was calculating; he used rituals integrated with a political agenda to assume ultimate control over the LRA soldiers and the surrounding population.¹³⁹

Initially, the LRA had the support of the Acholi population and other tribes in the north, but that support soon eroded as a result of the counterinsurgency operations in the north combined with the LRA’s increased violence towards civilians. The LRA did not have the same initial support from the population as its predecessors, the UNLA and the Holy Spirit Movement. A key concept to the LRA’s belief system was that not only would the Acholi have to fight the south, but also they would be required to purify the population by ridding it of corrupt Acholi. Only the LRA alone could decide who was a true Acholi and who was not. Violence towards civilians was ingrained into the movement from its inception; it was the LRA’s duty to use violence in order to carry out its political objectives. In 1991, the government of Uganda launched a massive counterinsurgency operation called Operation North with the intent of crushing the LRA.¹⁴⁰ Popular support dwindled as the LRA became more cruel and aggressive towards the population even those who supported them. The LRA used fear and brutality in an effort to prevent the locals from providing information to Museveni’s Uganda Peoples Defenses Force (UPDF).¹⁴¹ An illustration of these tactics is that

138 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 22.

139 Ehrenrieck, Rosa. “The Stories we must Tell: Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *Africa Today* 45, no. No. 1 (Jan 1998, 1998): 79.

140 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 23.

141 In 1995 the NRA per the new constitution was renamed to the UPDF.

suspected collaborators would have their noses, lips and ears severed. Also, local civilians were not allowed to use bicycles, because the LRA feared they could ride to the next village and warn the UPDF of their location. Breaking this rule resulted in a loss of limb for the violators.¹⁴² By the early 1990s, support for the LRA was waning and the insurgency needed to look for other means of recruitment and resources.

The LRA is most notorious for its abduction of children and use of them as child soldiers. Amnesty International estimates that nearly 80 percent of the LRA fighters were abducted children.¹⁴³ The forced recruitment of adolescents verses young adults was a logical decision by the LRA. Demographics supported this because a large surplus of young adolescents. As support from the local populations in Northern Uganda dwindled, the pool of able-bodied young fighters also began to diminish. Kony's army needed a means to continue fighting and engaging the UPDF. It was easier to abduct and manipulate groups of 15 year olds rather than 20 year olds adults.¹⁴⁴ The reason the LRA focused on abducting child soldiers is that these young people were thought to be the "nucleus of a new Acholi identity." These children are a clean slate to be filled with the ideals of the LRA.¹⁴⁵

The children were not just used as fighters. Estimates say that approximately twenty-five percent of those abducted were female. These girls became porters, cooks, and sex slaves for the army. Many soldiers took the girls as child-brides.¹⁴⁶ Once abducted, both the male and female children were forced to commit atrocities and violent ritualistic acts. One ten year old escapee describes such an incident, "On the third day a

142 Branch, A. "Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland (25)." Chap. 1, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 144. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

143 Dunn, Kevin. "Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 99 (March 2004, 2004): 139.

144 Blattman, C. and Annan, J. "On the Nature and Causes of LRA Abduction: What the Abductees Say." Chap. 7, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 144. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

145 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5-36.

146 Eichstaedt, P. *First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army*. Chicago: Lawrence Hills Books, 2009.

little girl tried to escape, and they made us kill her...[T]hey kicked her and jumped on her, and they made each of us beat her at least once with big pieces of wood.”¹⁴⁷ The LRA strategically uses violence amongst its abductees to prevent them from escaping. The children were afraid to leave for fear of death and afraid to return home after participating in brutal acts, such as killing another child or even a member of their own family.

The LRA’s use of children, as horrific as it seems to the outside world, is a cold and calculating part of their military strategy. Abducting adolescents is optimal because the children are physically able to perform military tasks. Child soldiers also have longevity because the children are more likely stay and live longer than an adult.¹⁴⁸ Also, though public support for LRA waned, they were still getting support in subtle and obscure ways. One UPDF officer explains, “They still love their sons, even if they are rebels. They want to keep their children alive.”¹⁴⁹ The forces recruitment of children led to force support by family members. The LRA knew it needed support from the population and decided to take by force what it needed to survive versus using the “winning the hearts and minds” method.

The 1991 Operation North almost completely wiped out the LRA, but Kony and his army managed to holdout through external support. By 1994, the LRA was fully supported by the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. The Sudanese government saw the LRA as a means to engage its own insurgency the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan. Khartoum supplied the LRA with weapons to include land mines; in return, the LRA would step up attacks against the SPLA.¹⁵⁰ The LRA moved into southern Sudan and began mounting attacks against the SPLA.

147 Ehrenrieck, Rosa. “The Stories we must Tell: Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *Africa Today* 45, no. No. 1 (Jan 1998, 1998): 79.

148 Blattman, C. and Annan, J. “On the Nature and Causes of LRA Abduction: What the Abductees Say.” Chap. 7, *In The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 154. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

149 Eichstaedt, P. *First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army*. Chicago: Lawarence Hills Books, 2009.

150 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

With a new life breathed back into the LRA, Kony was able to change up his tactics in Northern Uganda. From 1994 to 2005, the LRA's political agenda and popular support deteriorated even more as it received aid from Sudan. During this time frame, the majority of the population in the north did not support the LRA willingly. Losing the support of the Acholi majority and the success of Operation North left Kony feeling betrayed by his own people. It seemed the entire population had been declared guilty by the LRA as they stepped up attacks on the civilians in Northern Uganda.¹⁵¹ The LRA unleashed overwhelming violent tactics against the population because support from the locals was not as necessary with Sudan's help.¹⁵² The amount of violent attacks against the Acholi people increased dramatically. The LRA was responsible for major massacres, such as Atiak with an estimated 220 dead, Karuma with an estimated 50 dead, and Lokung-Palabek with an estimated 400 dead.¹⁵³ Forced recruitments and Sudanese support allowed the LRA to exist without popular support. But this arrangement between the LRA and Sudan did not last.

The LRA and the SPLA were tools for the proxy war between Uganda and Sudan; once the two countries were able to come to an agreement, the LRA's external support was shut off. In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the SPLA signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Without the SPLA to fight, Sudan had no reason to continue funneling money to the LRA. Once again, Kony had to adapt to a new situation and the LRA began to petition for peace talks. In July of 2006, the LRA and the government of Uganda began to engage in peace negotiations in Juba. These negotiations dragged on for two years as the LRA continually stalled the process. Kony strategically manipulated the peace process and the media to achieve strategic means.¹⁵⁴ While the government of

151 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

152 Mwenda, A. "Uganda's Politics of Foreign Aid and Violent Conflict: The Political Uses of the LRA Rebellion." Chap. 2, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 49. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

153 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (Jan., 1999): pp. 5–36.

154 Schomerus, M. "Chasing the Kony Story." Chap. 5, *In The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., 93. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

Uganda was focusing on peace talks, Joseph Kony and his army moved out of Northern Uganda and into Southern Sudan. Since 2006, the LRA has not been able to return to Uganda, but still wreaks havoc in neighboring countries.

Mainstream media and politicians have described the LRA over the past twenty-five years as lunatics and criminals. But as seen above, the LRA's brutal tactics were rational decisions, which shaped the environment of its soldiers and the civilians they terrorized. The LRA emerged as a result of a disenfranchised and marginalized population. It has made use of violence in an attempt to achieve the lofty political goal of overthrowing the Museveni government. Once popular support decreased significantly, the LRA turned to forced recruitment and external support for fighters and weapons. Though the LRA has left Uganda, the issues that began the conflict such as the marginalized north and the troubled economic conditions still remain in the post conflict environment. The next section will discuss how the UPDF's strategy evolved over the course of the conflict as it attempted to defeat the LRA.

D. THE UPDF: COIN IN NORTHERN UGANDA

The UPDF, which changed its name from NRA in 1995, has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations since the NRM took power in 1986. The UPDF's origins are as an insurgency when it overthrew the UNLA and transitioned from an insurgency to a counterinsurgent force in a matter of months. One would assume that coming from an insurgency, the UPDF would have an intimate understanding of COIN operations. However, this was not the case and the LRA was able to survive and conduct attacks in Northern Uganda for twenty years before leaving. The UPDF's COIN tactics in the North were heavy-handed and many times just as brutal as the LRA. Over the course of the conflict the UPDF began to professionalize its force, which also changed the way it conducted operations. This section will cover the counterinsurgency methods the UPDF utilized and the way it engaged the population.

When the NRM seized power and the signs uprising appeared in the north, Museveni's army conducted a vicious counterinsurgency-like campaign as an attempt to stomp out any rebellion. The civilians in the north received the brunt of the UPDF's

military action. During the early 1990's, UPDF soldiers repeatedly targeted the Acholi population because of its ethnic ties to the insurgency movements.¹⁵⁵ In 1991, the NRA launched the four-month military operation, Operation North. Though many LRA members were killed, the NRA refused to stay in local villages and protect the population from any returning LRA. The reprisals against civilians by the LRA number in the hundreds as suspected government collaborators were maimed and killed. Many locals felt that the NRA was reluctant to protect them from the insurgency and left them vulnerable to attacks.¹⁵⁶ The NRA left the population to suffer the consequences of its harsh counterinsurgency campaign.

In 2002, the UPDF launched the next major counterinsurgency operation in the north, Operation Iron Fist. Like Operation North, this major military action did capture and kill many LRA soldiers, but civilians suffered tremendously. During this operation like in the past, the UPDF committed atrocities against the civilian population in Northern Uganda. Members of the local Acholi tribe accounted rapes of civilians. These abuses only reinforced the distrust between northern Ugandans and the central government.¹⁵⁷

Despite the overwhelming military presence and action in Northern Uganda during Iron Fist, the operation failed to eradicate the LRA. Museveni, himself, directed the first Iron Fist campaign from a base in the north. It is estimated that over ten thousand UPDF troops were involved in the operation. While, the UPDF was applying pressure in the north and in parts of Sudan, Joseph Kony and his senior commanders evaded capture, again. The LRA was able to expand operations to new territories to the south to include Lira, Soroti, Apac and Katakwi districts of Uganda.¹⁵⁸ Iron Fist failed to

155 "Ugandan Human Rights Commission Annual Report: 2009–2010." Uganda Human Rights Commission (2010). http://www.uhrc.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=111

156 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

157 Dunn, Kevin. "Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 99 (March 2004, 2004): 139.

158 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

defeat the LRA. During the operation, the UPDF neglected to protect the civilians in the north; in fact, the UPDF was responsible for many of the non-combatant deaths that occurred. The UPDF COIN strategy was overly dependent on kinetic operations and lacked any emphasis on civilian protection.¹⁵⁹ The UPDF approach to COIN operations was not successful and did not embody the premise that the population is the center of gravity for both the insurgency and counterinsurgency.

COIN theory accepts that in order to defeat an insurgency, the counterinsurgent forces must remove the support of the local population. By isolating an insurgency, it cannot gain access to resources, intelligence, or people. However, the conditions of separation between insurgency from population should be made and kept by the population. Forced isolation rarely works. Mass movements and resettling a population is the absolute last resort and is “born out of the counterinsurgent’s weakness.”¹⁶⁰ The UPDF had limited success using kinetic operations, as the insurgency was able to maintain some level of support. The UPDF looked for a method to eliminate those support networks. In an attempt to isolate the LRA from the local population, the government of Uganda displaced large numbers of Acholi tribesmen into internally displaced personnel (IDP) camps. As the violence in the north raged on, the number of IDPs skyrocketed from 400,000 to 1.2 million from 2002 to 2006.¹⁶¹ The living conditions were unimaginable as hundreds of thousands crammed into IDP camps. The UPDF was able to remove large swaths of Acholi and Langi out of their homes; estimates have up to 90 percent of the Acholi population were displaced.¹⁶²

The choice of the government of Uganda to force its own population in the north to resettle as part of its domestic counterinsurgency strategy had negative impacts across the board, which would bleed over into the post conflict phase. Though the government’s

159 Spiegel, J. and Atama, N. “Finishing the Fight Against the LRA.” Enough (2009).

160 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Westport, CI: Praeger Security International, 1964.

161 “Ugandan Human Rights Commission Annual Report: 2009–2010.” Uganda Human Rights Commission (2010). http://www.uhrc.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=111

162 Finnstrom, S. *Living with Bad Surroundings*. NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

intent was to physically isolate the Acholi population from the LRA, the IDP camps attracted attacks by the LRA and abuses by the UPDF soldiers. The population in the north, felt more than ever, unsafe and neglected by the government. These feelings would resonate throughout the post conflict environment and reconstruction progress would be slow to start as a result. The IDP camps only deepened the mistrust that the northern population had towards the central government. The government's use of CMO was to remove the civilians from the battlefield. In theory, this should have isolated the insurgency and at the same time protected civilians from reprisals. This was not the case with the UPDF. Support for the LRA was already declining when UPDF began to strictly enforce the resettlements, meaning the civilian population had already begun disengaging with the LRA. The civilians in the north required protection from the LRA's forced recruitments and vicious raids instead of the harsh conditions of the IDP camps.

The IDP camps did not achieve the goal of eliminating civilian exposure to the LRA; those living in IDP camps were vulnerable to attacks by the LRA. Many women were raped and mutilated by the LRA when they went to fetch water outside of the camp. One father recounts how his daughter was ambushed in broad daylight outside of a camp in Gulu. The LRA cut off her lips and ears. "They told her to go back to the UPDF and say the LRA is waiting."¹⁶³ The IDP camps did not successfully isolate the civilians from the LRA influence, nor did they prevent the LRA from recruiting from the civilian population, either. The civilians had to leave the confines to gather food, water and other supplies not available inside the camps. The civilians were not protected by the UPDF when they left the camps; the LRA soldiers simply waited for the civilians to leave camp in order to assault them.

Not only did the IDP camps fail to achieve the intended goals, the strategy bred contempt for both the government and the UPDF as institutions. Life in the IDP camps was hard, full of fear, hunger and overcrowding. Jan Egeland, the UN chief humanitarian officer, said, "northern Uganda must be one of the worst humanitarian crises in the

163 Eichstaedt, P. *First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army*. Chicago: Lawrence Hills Books, 2009 (31).

world.”¹⁶⁴ There were reports that those attempting to leave the camps were beaten by the UPDF. Human rights violations inside the IDP camps continued, and the population was stuck between the horrors of the LRA at home or the brutality of the UPDF in the camps. Not only were the camps unsuccessful as a part of the UPDF COIN strategy, it also created huge problems in the post conflict phase as millions attempted to return back to their homes. The decision of the government to use COIN tactics that are considered to be the last resort on its own population proved to be unsuccessful. In the case of the forced resettlement, applying COIN strategies typically reserved for a third-party nation on a domestic population bred mistrust and sowed the seeds of the core grievances towards the central government even further. After years of physically removing people from their homes and neglecting to protect them from the LRA, the UPDF was looked upon as tool of oppression by the Museveni government. The UPDF would have to repair that reputation in order to rebuild the north. The methods the UPDF used to provide damage control from the fallout of domestic COIN operations will be discussed in the next chapter.

For over twenty years, the UPDF and government of Uganda conducted heavy-handed counterinsurgency operations on its own soil. The UPDF was not professional enough to handle its own population, suffering from a lack in training and coordination. The UPDF’s use of COIN tactics alienated the population. While the population did not out rightly support Kony and his violence, it did not trust the Museveni government or its military.¹⁶⁵ In March 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that the UPDF had committed repeated human rights abuses to include rape, mutilation of male genitalia and other forms of torture.¹⁶⁶ The UPDF had to change its policy and engage the population in order to truly defeat the insurgency.

The army realized that not only did the reputation of the UPDF need repair, but the entire government. Using CMO in the north, could not only function as

164 Finnstrom, S. *Living with Bad Surroundings*. NC: Duke University Press, 2008. (p141)

165 Feldman, R. “Why Uganda has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *Defense & Security Analysis* 24, no. 1 (March 2008, 2008): 45.

166 UNHCR Uganda country profile .<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html>

reconstruction efforts, but also possibly build a relationship between the north and the central government through a series of good public relations (PR). Through an integrated CMO strategy in the north, the government saw the ability rehabilitate its reputation as well as limit any remnants of support for the LRA. By the time the LRA moved to Southern Sudan, the UPDF knowing that its reputation as unprofessional was detrimental to success began to institute reforms. The UPDF began to conduct human rights training for its forces, increasing pay and benefits, and other measures to professionalize its force and repair its reputation. Human rights violators were brought to justice.¹⁶⁷ The UPDF began to focus on the non-kinetic CMO activities and training for its soldiers. These reforms were key to post conflict operations as the UPDF transitioned from operating in a combat zone to conducting stability and reconstruction operations in Northern Uganda. Also, using these CMO tactics domestically, the UPDF obtained approval from the local population and limit LRA sympathizers within the population. The following chapter will examine those CMO programs and determine if the UPDF achieved those objectives.

167 Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? The Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process (188)."

V. CMO IN UGANDA

A. NORTHERN UGANDA'S POST CONFLICT ERA

COIN doctrine is based on the idea that the population is the center of gravity. Both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency require support from the local population to achieve their ultimate endstates. The previous chapter illustrated how both the LRA and UPDF sought to influence the population through violence and coercion rather than using non-kinetic measures to secure support. As the conflict evolved, the UPDF implemented counterinsurgency strategies such as forced relocations and intense combat operations to overwhelm the LRA. The UPDF's extremely forceful techniques further alienated the northern population from a government by which they already felt marginalized. The UPDF used harsh methods to isolate the LRA, but neglected to protect the population or attempt to "win the hearts and minds" through non-military action. Both sides failed to gain popular support in the north. After twenty years of conflict, the LRA could no longer maintain an operational base in Uganda; however, the organization was able to survive and poses a continued threat to the security of Northern Uganda and other countries in the region. The post conflict environment left the Government of Uganda challenged with integrating a dejected northern population back into the national scene. Through a series of training, education and shifting its doctrine, the UPDF began to adopt CMO concepts from the United States and other western militaries. The UPDF implemented these CMO and COIN concepts within its own territory of Northern Uganda. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the CMO activities in Northern Uganda and determine if adopting CMO concepts like those found in Joint Publication 3-57 Civil-Military Operations can be effectively used by a military on its own population in the post conflict environment.

The cessation of outright combat did not mean that total peace had been achieved, however. The post conflict landscape in Northern Uganda was volatile and unstable with over 1.6 million IDPs residing in 218 official camps and several unplanned

camps.¹⁶⁸ The operational environment was filled with challenges for every organization involved in the post conflict recovery, including the UPDF. Aside from rebuilding a war-torn north, the UPDF had to overcome several major issues distinct to the army to include the fact that it was operating within its own country's borders.

One major obstacle the military faced was improving its public relations (PR) with a despondent population. More than anything, CMO activities and projects presented an opportunity for the Government of Uganda to improve its reputation with its own population by effectively using the UPDF. Abuses, human rights violations and the unwillingness to protect civilians had all eroded the confidence of the population towards the army. Through its history as the NRA led by president Museveni, the UPDF is directly linked to the central government. The marginalization and abuses by the UPDF only fueled the core grievances against the government as a whole, from which the original conflict had emerged. This chapter will show that the UPDF was able to achieve goals of assisting in the reconstruction and positively influencing the population using CMO as its primary tool.

The UPDF is just one of many players conducting reconstruction operations in the north. It is imperative to examine the whole picture of the reconstruction strategy before assessing the UPDF's impact. This chapter will first review the overall reconstruction efforts in the north. The next section will outline how the UPDF transitioned its organization through training and education in order to implement CMO. Projects and actual efforts conducted by the UPDF will be examined to establish if they were able to achieve their intended purposes. Finally, this study will determine the indicators of successful CMO in Northern Uganda. Through these assessments, one can deduce that UPDF's application of CMO simultaneously enhanced the reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda and the UPDF's image.

168 Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? The Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process (188)."

B. RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA

Northern Uganda's reconstruction efforts began immediately following the departure of the LRA. The government, NGOs, and the international community all gravitated to the crisis in Uganda and developed individual plans to rebuild the north. However, the massive influx of actors from across the globe made a comprehensive reconstruction strategy impossible. Many organizations and NGOs acted unilaterally to achieve their specific goals. Despite the complications of developing a single strategy, reconstruction programs and projects commenced. This section will outline several of the major reconstruction challenges presented in Northern Uganda and analyze the efforts conducted by the Government of Uganda and international donors to address those challenges.

1. The Effects of Reintegration

The post-conflict environment in Northern Uganda contended with hundreds of thousands of IDPs returning home, wrecked or non-existent infrastructure, and a massive influx of aid. In addition to these complex issues, the population of the north also had to deal with LRA soldiers returning home and seeking reconciliation. The Government of Uganda needed to develop a systematic way to reintegrate these members back into society. Bringing ex-LRA soldiers back into the fold was an emotional and difficult process. Most of the LRA fighters were Acholi as were the majority of LRA victims, which led to difficulties in the process. Because of the involvement of Acholi as both perpetrators and victims, the atonement process had to include Acholi culture and tradition to for the ex-fighters to be cleansed in minds of the population and the former LRA soldiers. To appease both the legal and spiritual aspects of the situation, the reconciliation process included both the Acholi ritual aspect and government-administered justice.¹⁶⁹ According to interviews with the local population, most Northern Ugandans were willing to welcome back LRA fighters because they were

¹⁶⁹ Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? the Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process (242)."

viewed as children. Reconciliation of ex-LRA fighters remained instrumental to the post conflict environment and necessary for the forward momentum of Northern Uganda.

2. Coordinating Efforts in a Flood of International Aid

Once the LRA left Uganda, the environment opened up for aid workers to flood the scene; however, these international donors did not coordinate their efforts. Some NGOs and donors were actually competing amongst each other for projects and funds. The large number of donors and infighting made a synchronized reconstruction effort almost impossible.¹⁷⁰ The European Commission's (EC) quarterly report on Uganda stated that both the EC and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) had attempted mapping and harmonizing efforts, but the lack of information sharing and consolidation caused a plethora of problems for donors.¹⁷¹ With the gap in information and coordination, both the EC and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) reported large amounts of money were unaccounted for due to corruption.¹⁷² Money intended for small community projects had not made it to the end users, leaving Northern Ugandans despondent.

Other international donors and programs began to take shape in 2006 once the LRA's physical threat dissipated. UNOCHA began to transition from an emergency relief to focusing on development.¹⁷³ The World Bank implemented the NUSAF; a program designed to empower communities in Northern Uganda by "enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs and implement sustainable development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities."¹⁷⁴ In the past five years, NUSAF has funded the development of major

¹⁷⁰ Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? the Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process (197)."

¹⁷¹ "Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report." Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008) pp19.

¹⁷² Mugisa, Anne. "Second Phase of NUSAF Launched." (8 Feb 2010, 2010).
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/709506>

¹⁷³ "Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Makes." U.S. Virtual Presence Post (2008).

¹⁷⁴<http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=28424&Projectid=P002952>

infrastructure projects to include roads and hydro-power stations in the north. Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) established a USG Gulu Branch in June 2006.¹⁷⁵ Donors, NGOs and money began pouring into the north, but not all of the funds made it to the intended location.

3. Domestic Issues within Reconstruction

The first indication that Northern Uganda had entered into the post conflict phase was the government's participation in peace negotiations with the LRA in Juba. The peace talks eventually failed due for two reasons. First, neither side actually ended combat operations. While peace talks were underway, the UPDF launched a massive offensive, Operation Lighting Thunder, in the DRC section of Garamba National Park to hunt and kill Joseph Kony. The operation resulted in retaliation by the LRA in which they assaulted villages in the DRC, reportedly raping over 200 civilians.¹⁷⁶ Second, the International Criminal Court's (ICC) indictments against Joseph Kony for human rights abuses left the LRA feeling cornered by the international community. The peace talks fell apart in 2008 when Joseph Kony refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), stating that he would rather die in the bush than turn himself in to the ICC or the Government of Uganda.¹⁷⁷

Though the peace talks were a stalling tactic for the LRA in order to orchestrate their escape to neighboring countries, the north embarked on the road to reconstruction in the wake of hostilities. The Government of Uganda and the international community turned their attention to post conflict activities. In 2007, the Government of Uganda initiated the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). The intent of the program was to stabilize the north through peace, recovery and development, as it was so adequately named. The plan outlined four strategic objectives: "consolidation of state authority; peace-building and reconciliation; rebuilding and empowering communities;

175 "Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Makes." U.S. Virtual Presence Post (2008).

176 Spiegel, J. and Atama, N. "Finishing the Fight Against the LRA." Enough (2009).

177 "Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report." Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008). pp. 8.

and rebuilding the economy of Northern Uganda.”¹⁷⁸ The program was originally designed to be a three-year program with a \$609M budget, 70 percent provided by donors and the Government of Uganda would fund the remaining 30 percent. The PRDP primarily focused on the technical aspects of rebuilding central and local government institutions, improving services, and revitalizing the economy.¹⁷⁹ The Norwegian Agency for Development’s appraisal of the program noted that in the areas of empowering the community, districts and sub-counties developed innovative approaches to use the conditional grants provided by the program. Local governments were able to create budgets and district level expenditures. At the same time, these local actors were constrained by their lack of capacity to implement larger programs and typically kept expenditures small. Success was on a district-to-district basis; the larger more developed districts were able to implement the PRDP with more ease than the lesser-developed districts with smaller staffs.¹⁸⁰

The limited success of the PRDP was a result of low local capacity, embezzlement at national and provincial levels and the diversion of funds for political ends particularly around the February 2011 elections.¹⁸¹ Initially, there were disagreements about which districts in the north should receive PRDP funds. There were also concerns that politicians were abusing funds for their own benefit. And finally, no consensus was reached on how to manage the funds. Though \$609 million seems to be a large amount of money, the sum is small in terms of economic development programming, especially taking into account that the conflict had lasted over twenty-years.¹⁸² In 2009, the Government of Uganda could not uphold its 30 percent

178 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

179 Clasussen, Jens, Randi Lotsberg, Anne Nkute, and Erlend Nordby. Appraisal of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, 2008 (accessed November 15, 2011).

180 Clasussen, Jens, Randi Lotsberg, Anne Nkute, and Erlend Nordby. Appraisal of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, 2008 (accessed November 15, 2011).

181 International Crisis Group. *The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?* 2011 (8).

182 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. *The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, 2010.

commitment to the PRDP as it had succumbed to the ebb of economic tides.¹⁸³ The deferral outraged the citizens of the north and the international community, so much that the United Kingdom temporarily threatened to make its own contribution conditionally based.¹⁸⁴ The PRDP made a small impact on the development of Northern Uganda, despite its financial and managerial troubles. Even with the PRDP progress, the region still lagged behind the rest of Uganda.

The post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda have been complex. The reintegration of returning ex-LRA soldiers challenged the government's ability to reconcile the northern population. The Government of Uganda, donors, civil society, ex-LRA fighters and the international community all were faced with the difficulties of coordination, information sharing, and bringing Northern Uganda up to par with the rest of the country. The next section will outline how the UPDF has been key to assisting in Northern Uganda's reconstruction.

C. THE UPDF SHIFT TO CMO

Moving into a post-conflict phase, the UPDF was not an organization with a history of partnering with civil society. The UPDF's status in Northern Uganda prior to 2006 waffled between being heavy-handed and overly ambivalent. After years of abuse, human rights violations and lack of protection, the population in the north had no reason to trust the UPDF or the central government. This lack of trust had to be addressed in order for the country to move forward as a whole. Not only did the UPDF need an adjustment on how it engaged civilians, it needed a total makeover in the eyes of the public. The UPDF's post conflict CMO objects were two fold, improve the UPDF's public image and at the same time assist in the overall stability and reconstruction efforts taking place in Northern Uganda. In order to achieve these goals the UPDF underwent dramatic internal changes. As an organization and as individual soldiers, the UPDF embarked on several training programs to enhance the ability of the army to engage with

183 Clasussen, Jens, Randi Lotsberg, Anne Nkute, and Erlend Nordby. *Appraisal of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda*, 2008 (accessed November 15, 2011).

184 Perrot, S. "Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? The Impact of the Internationalization of the Resolution Process (201).".

civilians. Through training and re-shaping the mindset of its soldiers, the UPDF emerged as experts on civil military operations.¹⁸⁵ This section will show how the UPDF used training and education to accomplish an organizational shift towards non-kinetic operations and CMO in the post conflict environment.

1. Internal directives

In order to recast the mindset of the UPDF, soldiers and commanders alike required a new lens to view how it treated the population. In May of 2006, the UPDF in cooperation with the ICRC completed its first “Train of the Trainers Course” on the Law of Armed Conflict International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This program produced IHL instructors internal to the UPDF. The UPDF also signed three military directives for future IHL initiatives. The first directive ensured that soldiers at the lowest levels received proper training on international humanitarian law. The second directive focused on the quality of training amongst senior leadership and within the UPDF professional education programs. And the third directive was a working plan to implement a Memorandum of Cooperation between the UPDF and ICRC.¹⁸⁶

Within two years of these directives, the UPDF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ICRC stating that the UPDF would formally integrate international humanitarian law within its military doctrine, training, and operations. The MOU meant the continuation of the “train the trainer” course, graduating approximately twenty-five UPDF instructors and legal officers per session. By continuing the course, the UPDF could sustain the training without international assistance. Within a month of signing the MOU, over 500 UPDF soldiers had received training along with members of the general public and administrators in the Northern District of Gulu.¹⁸⁷ Even though it took two years for the intended ICRC training to trickle down to the end users in the north, training and education were occurring at all levels within the UPDF.

¹⁸⁵ Phone Interview conducted with MAJ Jesus Rodriguez, the U.S. CAT OIC in charge of training the UPDF.

¹⁸⁶ “UPDF Trains International Humanitarian Law.” *Tarehe Sita* 19, no. 6 (June 2006, 2006): 12.

¹⁸⁷ Peace Process.” Embassy of the United States (2009) Usvpp.gov.

Along with basic human rights training the UPDF launched new CMO programs to educate general forces on the salience of civil-military relations. President Museveni, also the most senior ranking officer in the UPDF, emphasized the building of civil-military capacity. While addressing a group of soldiers in 2006, he pointed out that the UPDF needed to treat civilians with respect. Museveni used an analogy based on a quote by the revolutionary leader in China, Mao tse Tung, which states, “The Army of the people must be like fish in the water. Without the water, the fish would die.” The quote emphasizes the need for support from the population for the army. President Museveni focused on that same concept of developing a strategic relationship with the people of Uganda, by directing his soldiers, “You cannot be like a fish in the water when [you] are stealing from people [and while] you are barking at people because you are soldiers. You should reinforce discipline [among yourselves].”¹⁸⁸ The civil-military dynamic was an important aspect to the central government’s plan in the north.

2. Partnered Forces

The UPDF has received training from various partnered militaries to improve its civil-military relations. In 2007, the Canadian government trained UPDF soldiers in Pease Support Operations (PSO). One major tenet of the training was Military-Civilian Cooperation. The mantra that the civilians should lead these efforts appeared in this evolution as one soldier quoted, “Cooperating with locals in the peace mission is a must. You are working from them. They are your masters.”¹⁸⁹ The concept that the civilians are the “masters” was new compared to how the UPDF operated in the past. The idea of integrating of civilian and military national assets to achieve and maintain peace appeared in various UPDF articles and interviews during this time. In 2009, educational articles on the functionality of Civil Affairs appeared in the *Tarehe Sita*, the UPDF’s professional

188 Mugerwa, Tom. “Our Strategic Relationship with the People.” *Tarehe Sita* 19, no. 2 (February 2006, 2006): 4.

189 Tingira, Atenyi. “Canada Trains UPDF.” *Tarehe Sita* 20, no. 5 (May, 2007): 24.

military publication. The article specifically alluded to U.S. Civil Affairs and UN CIMIC doctrine to elaborate on the overall role of CMO within operations.¹⁹⁰

In 2010, the United States sponsored CMO training for 160 UPDF soldiers. The training lasted two weeks and was integrated into a full spectrum operations exercise.¹⁹¹ MAJ Jesus Rodriguez, U.S. Army, states in an interview “The U.S. did not open the UPDF’s eyes to CMO. They understood the concept; it was already integrated into how they operate. We were there to show them some of our best practices and teach them [tactics, techniques and procedures] that we had garnished from Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁹² By providing training to its soldiers the UPDF displayed a commitment to integrating CMO into its overall operations. The human rights training and incorporation of basic CMO doctrine enhanced the UPDF’s ability to conduct post conflict operations in the north and at the same time has improved the reputation of the UPDF among the general population. The next section will review various CMO activities the UPDF has executed in the north and determine the impact of those operations.

D. EVALUATION OF UPDF CMO ACTIVITIES

The UPDF’s application of CMO principles on its own territory resulted in the increased approval ratings of the military and central government over the past five years in Northern Uganda. The European Commission reported, “The UPDF became one core partner in civil military co-operation interventions together with Civil Society and Local Government actors. The intervention has increased the confidence between the UPDF and civil society towards restoring law and order.”¹⁹³ The UPDF displayed its ability to bring in assets of national power and international donors to achieve post conflict

¹⁹⁰ Obbo, Henry. “Roles of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Department.” *Tarehe Sita* 22, no. 6 (June 2009, 2009):pp. 16.

¹⁹¹ The military exercise focused on all the phases of warfare from phase 0 thru phase V. The CMO portion was only a part of the entire training evolution.

¹⁹² Phone Interview conducted with MAJ Jesus Rodriguez, the U.S. CAT OIC in charge of training the UPDF

¹⁹³ “Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report.” Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008). pp. 34.

stability in the north. The UPDF's CMO activities in Northern Uganda were not just limited to random or small impact projects; they covered the full spectrum of civil military operations. The success of the full range of CMO activities has increased the UPDF's standings among the population in the north.

1. Specific Projects and Programs

The UPDF directly assisted in the reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda through its comprehensive use of the principles of CMO. In order to assist in the restoration of civil order, a combination of both police and military forces deployed to the north. The Instrument for Stability intervention is a UPDF led initiative, which was aimed at promoting peace and security.¹⁹⁴ The ultimate goal is to transition the north back to civil authorities and move the UPDF to more traditional military roles. Through this initiative, the UPDF provided train the trainer courses for the Child- Family Protection Police units in order to strengthen these units' capabilities.¹⁹⁵ The Child-Family Protection Police focus on domestic issues within the population, such as child abuse or domestic violence. Joint training with law enforcement and increasing police capacity, allowed the UPDF to step back from policing roles. As early as 2006, the UPDF began to turn over law enforcement responsibilities to the Ugandan Police as well as conducting joint operations to ensure a smooth transition to civil authority.¹⁹⁶ The coordinated training with the police force showed the people of Northern Uganda that the UPDF was ready to relinquish its past role as an internal policing unit. Those past policing roles have been associated with the barrage of human rights violations that plagued the UPDF's reputation. By turning over the rule of law back to civil authorities, the UPDF made the statement that it was a different army than it was twenty years ago.

¹⁹⁴ Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a Ugandan led program that has the overall objective of promoting peace and stability Northern Uganda, including the Karamoja Region. The core partner in this program is the UPDF.

¹⁹⁵ "Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report." Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008). pp. 34

¹⁹⁶ "Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Makes." U.S. Virtual Presence Post (2008).

In 2008, the UPDF opened four Civil Military Coordination Centers (CMCCs) in the northern region of Karamoja. The purpose of a CMCC is a single location where civilians and the military can coordinate reconstruction efforts. The CMCC's objective is to integrate civil partners, police, and the UPDF to undertake community level civil-military work and jointly address security needs.¹⁹⁷ The CMCCs are not only functional in coordinating relief and development activities but act as visible symbols of the military and government's commitment to local communities down to the sub-district level. The CMCCs are physical evidence that the UPDF became central to reconstruction coordination. These centers served as public announcements that the UPDF was going to be involved in the reconstruction process for the long-term.

Along with integration and training, the UPDF has also been involved in a multitude of projects, from small impact to large infrastructure. The smaller projects include, but are not limited to, the refurbishment of local government buildings and schools, medical engagements, veterinary engagements and donations to local governments. Some examples of the smaller level projects include donations to the Amuria Hospital and conducting dental treatments for 2000 people and along with immunizations. The UPDF has intentionally focused on areas attacked by the LRA. One example is the donation of supplies to a primary school in Teso, an area devastated by the LRA.¹⁹⁸ By paying specific attention to areas that were targeted by the LRA, the UPDF is able to show the population that they are not the enemy. The projects emphasize the message that the LRA has left and what they stood for is gone; however, the UPDF and national government remain and will help rebuild the lives ruined by the war. Though these particular projects are small in nature, the purpose is designed to communicate something much deeper than simple donations and vaccinations- it is meant to build a rapport between the government and the people of Northern Uganda.

The UPDF has used CMO efforts in conjunction with combined or joint military exercises in the north. For instance, as a culminating event in 2009's combined exercise,

197 "Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Makes." U.S. Virtual Presence Post (2008).

198 Lukanda, Ivan." *Tarehe Sita*.19, no. 3 (March 2006, 2006): 8-9.

Natural Fire 10, the UPDF led a massive medical engagement in Kitgum, where over 11,600 patients were treated.¹⁹⁹ During that same exercise, an engineering unit rehabilitated a dining facility and a classroom for a local school as well as a church.²⁰⁰ After a CMO training exercise in 2010, UPDF soldiers refurbished several buildings to hone their new skill sets. UPDF engineers have also conducted road repairs and improvements on roads that lead to district headquarters, assisting in the promotion of commerce as a part of their own military training.²⁰¹

The Government of Uganda has deliberately selected cities in Northern Uganda, such as Gulu and Kitgum, as the sites for these major combined exercises with the United States and neighboring African countries. Bringing in militaries from multiple countries can generate capital for the selected locations and as well as good publicity for the UPDF. The potential for local economies to surge from the influx of military units exists as thousands of soldiers pour into the area for the exercise. In return, this can affect the standing of the army with local merchants. At the same time, the UPDF is conducting medical engagements and school refurbishments to access and influence the rest of the population.²⁰² Again, using small but highly visible projects the UPDF is capitalizing on CMO to enhance its public image. The UPDF is able to deliver aid to communities in the north; promoting the idea that the government can deliver to the population.

Demining is another CMO project, unique to the UPDF's capabilities. The demining and sweeping for unexploded ordinances (UXO) is an inherent military task that the UPDF is able to apply as it assists civilians who are adjusting to the post conflict environment. IDPs in the north have expressed fear in returning home due to landmines. The UPDF is able to specifically address the concerns of those citizens by clearing large

199 Natural Fire 10 is a military exercise that involves armies from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the United States. The 2009 exercise was named Natural Fire 10, because it was the tenth phase of this exercise, which has occurred annually since 1998.

200 Kakurungu, Ronald. "Kitgum Reaps from Army Exercise." *Tarehe Sita* 22, no. 12 (Dec 2009, 2009): 18.

201 Sserwadda, Godfrey. "UPDF Heals Karamoja [Part 2]." *Tarehe Sita* 22, no. 10 (Oct 2009, 2009): 28.

202 Kakurungu, Ronald. "Kitgum Reaps from Army Exercise." *Tarehe Sita* 22, no. 12 (Dec 2009, 2009): 18.

tracts of land for resettlement. Since 2006, the UPDF has uncovered 15,214 UXO and over twenty landmines.^{203/204} Conducting demining operations makes a statement to the local population that UPDF soldiers are willing to risk their own lives to clear the areas of possible UXOs. These types of operations counter past notions that the UPDF and central government do not care about the people in the north. Not only does the CMO activity remove the potential threats for the local population and create a secure environment for people to cultivate land; it resonates the strategic message to the population that the government will keep them safe.

The UPDF instituted a region-wide “cash for work” program as an integrated effort to disarm individuals in the northern region. This CMO program was a part of a greater security strategy specific to the large amount of cattle raiders who surfaced from the Karamoja Region, west of Acholiland. As a result of years of battling the LRA, areas in the north have been ignored by the central government as it focused solely on the Acholi problem. The Karamoja region has a history of cattle raiding, but without the Government of Uganda’s presence and control the number of cattle raiders and outlaws skyrocketed. The bandits, who had been armed with bows and arrows in the past, were able to acquire small arms and automatic weapons because of the war. The Karamoja Region became a haven for cattle raiders and armed men after years of government neglect. The Karamoja outlaws posed a viable security threat to rebuilding the north.²⁰⁵ Since the LRA has left Uganda, the UPDF was able to turn its attention to the disarmament campaign in Karamoja. This campaign used both kinetic and non-kinetic operations to bring the rule of law back to the region. In conjunction with its security patrols in Karamoja, the UPDF also began implementing a “cash for work” program to dissuade the youth from joining cattle raiders. The “cash for work” is a classic CMO tool, to take fighters off the streets and give them a steady income. The UPDF’s choice of the “cash for work” program in conjunction with active patrols and raids on weapons

203 “Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Makes.” U.S. Virtual Presence Post (2008).

204 From this article, UXO are items such as unexploded artillery rounds and other projectiles that did not detonate on impact, while landmines are intentionally laid devices buried beneath the surface.

205 “Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report.” Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008). pp. 32.

cash-for-work sends a distinct message to the north. First, the cash for work program gives criminals a viable alternative to banditry and the option to make money legitimately. The second message comes from the kinetic action, which indicates to the outlaws- if you do not give up your weapons to the UPDF, they will come and take them from you physically. The “cash for work program” synchronized both kinetic principles with non-kinetic means to bring more stability in the Karamoja Region. By containing the security threat in Karamoja, the UPDF provided an environment in which the other northern districts could focus on rebuilding.

Other UPDF CMO projects focus on larger strategic impacts. Though these projects do not specifically address the north, they still affect reconstruction and economic development in that region. For example in 2010, the UPDF engineers began assessments to assist in the rebuilding of the Ugandan railways. This project has massive implications for economic development for the entire country.²⁰⁶ Improving the rails system could increase nationwide commerce, which would eventually trickle to the northern region. The repairs of the Ugandan railways have the potential to symbolize both the capacity and might of not just the UPDF, but Uganda as a whole. Though construction efforts have not commenced, the railway project illustrates how the UPDF implements CMO in its own territory. The UPDF projects are not only chosen to serve a functional purpose in reconstruction efforts, but also produce prominent symbols of the state to display its good will to the public.

The UPDF represented by the CMCCs functions as a central point of coordination for development activities in the north. With the issues of disjointed international aid and lack of civil authority in the north, the UPDF has been able to bring together the important players in development and get results. The UPDF has established CMCCs at both district and sub-district levels to promote good civil-military relations.²⁰⁷ The European Commission and other development partners have recognized the importance

206 “Army Africa, SDDC Partner with Uganda Military to Assess Railway Reconstruction “ U.S. Fed News Service, Including U.S. State News (Oct 29 2010, 2010).

207 Sserwadda, Godfrey. “UPDF Heals Karamoja [Part 2].” *Tarehe Sita* 22, no. 10 (Oct 2009, 2009): 28.

of the UPDF's role as a partner in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The European Commission has gone so far as to credit the UPDF as a central player in the reconstruction of the north.²⁰⁸ The UPDF has managed a major transformation in civil-military relations over the past five years. Through training, operations, and coordination, the UPDF has emerged as an important player in the reconstruction and development of the north. According to UPDF officials, the reputation and approval of the army has improved tremendously since 2006. The implementation of CMO principles has improved the UPDF's reputation among the population and has been instrumental in the overall reconstruction of Northern Uganda.

2. Indicators of success

The reconstruction efforts and CMO projects in the north are ongoing and the true measures of success may not be seen for years to come. However, one can gauge the immediate impacts the UPDF is having on the north by studying specific trends that emerge from the region. The UPDF's role in post conflict is tied to the overall reconstruction and development of Northern Uganda. Indicators of recovery can be measured in economic growth. The UPDF's primary function in the north is to provide security in the region in order for development to occur. By examining the perception of improved security, one can determine whether or not the UPDF is able to provide security and at the same time convince the population that the UPDF and the government will continue to protect them. A major tenant in the UPDF's CMO activities is to regain public trust in both its army and the government. By examining public opinion polls from the north about perceptions and approval of the government, one can determine the success of this CMO objective to a degree. Public opinion data is based on many factors outside of the UPDF, but an upward trend in government approval indicates that public relations are improving. This next section will look at indicators in economic growth, improved security, and public opinion to determine the salience of the UPDF's CMO campaign in Northern Uganda.

208 "Uganda-European Commission Joint Annual Report." Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2008, 2008). pp. 19.

a. Economic Growth

A major concern for those involved in the recovery efforts was the ability for returnees from IDP camps to resettle and reactivate the economy. With over 90 percent of the Acholi population forced to relocate and abandon their livelihood, the economy in Northern Uganda prior to 2006 looked grim. By 2007, the economic outlook began to change as more individuals returned to their homes. In a study funded by the Norwegian embassy in Kampala, returnees had begun to reengage in economic activities such as cultivating land and herding.²⁰⁹ Though the study did not measure the impact of returnees to the northern economy, it displayed an upward trend in livelihood activities. These activities directly translate to an increase in commerce and market places, which eventually spur economic growth.

The World Bank projected an increase in agriculture production in the north as a result of both returnees engaging in farming and raising livestock.²¹⁰ This assertion is supported by the 2010 statistics provided by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. The 2008 livestock census shows that the northern region had the biggest share cattle and goats with 34.3 percent of the nation's cattle and 37.4 percent of the nation's goats. These numbers were projected to grow at three percent in 2009.²¹¹ These statistics illustrate that the economic space is opening up for more opportunities in agriculture, which can lead to potential economic growth overall. The increase of livestock in the economic sector is positive and can be tied back to the reconstruction efforts.

With the increase in returnees and development of the agriculture in the north, the economy continues to grow and with that growth comes improvements in quality of life. The World Bank in its 2010 report asserts that the reconstruction efforts have increased the livelihoods among forty-seven percent of the population in northern

²⁰⁹ Bjorkhaug, Ingunn, Morten Boas, Anne Hatloy, and Kathleen Jennings. Return Livelihood Trend in Northern Uganda, 2007 (accessed November 18, 2011).

²¹⁰ International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda for the Period of FY 2011–2015, 2010 (6).

²¹¹ Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2010 Statistical Abstract, 2010 (accessed November 18, 2011): 42.

Uganda, against a target of thirty percent. These programs have improved access to social services through NUSAF.²¹² The economy in Northern Uganda is slowly taking off and with that the lives of those living in the north are improving.

The number of Northern Ugandans who live below the poverty line is still extraordinarily high, despite poverty reduction efforts with the PRDP and NUSAF. The rate still lingers at over 60 percent of the population living in poverty. There have been minimal decreases in the poverty rate since 2005. The poverty reduction programs are still working in conjunction with those designed to stimulate economic growth. The full extent of the reconstruction effects on the economy in Northern Uganda remains to be seen, as it has only been five years since the LRA left Uganda. But the positive growth in agriculture and working returnees indicates intermediate success on the road towards long-term development.

b. Improved Security

Improvements in the security situation on the ground and local perceptions about the ability to work and live free of danger are also measures of the UPDF's success. The security aspect is unique to the UPDF compared to its development partners, because the army is charged with protecting the population. This means protecting the population from armed groups, landmines and other dangers that threaten the environment for development to occur.²¹³ Improved security not only affects the ability for the northern population to function as a society, but it also increases the UPDF's clout amongst the populous for providing safety.

The population in Northern Uganda has seen an increase in stability and security since 2006. The 2011 Afrobarometer, a public opinion survey, showed that 66 percent of Northern Ugandans polled felt that the government was doing a good job

²¹² Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2010 Statistical Abstract, 2010 (accessed November 18, 2011): 106.

²¹³ "Uganda's Political History 1884–2009: American Navy Learns Uganda's History." *Tarehe Sita* 22, no.8 (Sep 2009, 2009):28.

providing safety from crime and violence.²¹⁴ Another public opinion survey concludes that not only are Northern Ugandans safer than in 2006, but they also feel safer.²¹⁵ These surveys illustrate that the incidences of violence has decreased significantly. Individuals feel freer to go to work, collect water or wood, and carry on with their lives. Not all those individuals questioned in the Transitioning to Peace survey attributed the increased security to the UPDF or the state, but over 65 percent related it to one or the other. Over 75 percent surveyed in the same study felt that the security situation would only get better with time.²¹⁶ These surveys indicate that a large majority of the northern population credits the newfound security with the UPDF and the government. This displays that the image of the UPDF has transitioned from heavy-handed and oppressive to an organization credited with protecting its own population. The improved security and opinions of the northern population are markers to a successful CMO strategy.

c. Improved Perceptions of National Government

The goal of the UPDF is to use its success in reconstruction efforts and security in the north to rebuild its reputation from the conflict. For most northerners, the UPDF represents the central government as a whole and by improving the UPDF's image; the government itself can increase its approval by the population. The Transition to Peace polling data shows that most Northern Ugandans have limited contact with authorities, which means that the UPDF may be the only exposure individuals receive from the national government.²¹⁷ This section will look at the public opinion regarding the government as whole a determining factor in whether or not the UPDF's goals have been achieved.

²¹⁴ Summary of Results Round 4.5(2) AFROBarometer Pre-Election Survey in Uganda 2011, 2010 (accessed November 15, 2011): 40.

²¹⁵ Pham, Phuong and Patrick Vinck. Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda. CA: Human Rights Center University of California Berkeley, 2010 (accessed November 10, 2011): 23.

²¹⁶ Pham, Phuong and Patrick Vinck. Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda. CA: Human Rights Center University of California Berkeley, 2010 (accessed November 10, 2011): 23.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 32.

A 2010 survey for the upcoming elections showed an increase in voter turnout in the north. In 2006, only 72 percent of northerners voted, where over 93 intended to vote in the 2011 elections. This is partly because many did not have access to voting while in IDPs camps. But only 7 percent of northerners plan to abstain from voting indicates that a majority of the population believes in the electoral process, at least enough so to vote. This increase of involvement illustrates that the population in the north believes the process is important and they have a voice in the government.²¹⁸

The 2011 Afrobarometer data showed that a significant number of the northerners polled approved of Museveni's performance from 2009–2010. Less than 20 percent either strongly disapproved or disapproved of the president, which meant that the vast majority of 80 percent were either neutral or positive towards the president's performance. The same poll had results for high approval ratings of the ruling political party, the NRM.²¹⁹ These ratings are evidence that the opinions of the central government, through the president and the ruling party, have improved since 2006. The image of Museveni in Northern Uganda has transitioned from a man whose rise to the presidency resulted in three major insurgencies, to a president who has an 80 percent approval rating from the north. The transition of the central government's image in the north has been remarkable considering the undercurrent of core grievances and the ethnopolitics that existed in the region. The UPDF's transformation in the eyes of the public is just as noteworthy. Though not all of the population approves of the government or has moved on from the war, the overwhelming majority is ready to build a future within the current political system. The UPDF has been able to successfully use CMO programs and activities to influence the population to this end.

The UPDF seems to have achieved both of its goals of assisting in the overall reconstruction in the north and improving the army's image. The impacts from small projects to large regional and nationwide initiatives have improved the economic

218 Pham, Phuong and Patrick Vinck. *Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda*. CA: Human Rights Center University of California Berkeley, 2010 (accessed November 10, 2011): 34.

219 Summary of Results Round 4.5(2) AFROBarometer Pre-Election Survey in Uganda 2011, 2010 (accessed November 15, 2011): 42.

growth in the over arching recovery plan. By incorporating CMO activities with security operations, the UPDF has improved the conditions in the north. The increased security and slow growing economy have correlated with the increased positive perceptions of the government as a whole. Executing CMO campaigns is a relatively quick means to gain public buy-in, as the UPDF has been able to pull off this enormous shift in public opinion within five years of post conflict operations. The UPDF has been able to recover its reputation among a scorned population through strategic use of CMO within its own borders.

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VI. CONCLUSION

This study began by exploring the relevance of population-centric strategies within the post conflict environment and how that relationship related to the salience of CMO in COIN, stability operations and HA. During counterinsurgency operations, both insurgents and counterinsurgents struggle for influence over the population. COIN doctrine is based on the concept that gaining the population's support is key to defeating an insurgency. Once the insurgency is isolated from the population, it cannot gain enough traction to force changes upon the state. Stability Operations are directly linked to improving government capacity and providing basic services to a civilian population. HA is intended provide relief and emergency aid for either man-made or natural disasters. Each of these post conflict operations are affected by the human dynamics that exist in each particular environment. When conducting post conflict operations a military must have the means to address the complexity of that human terrain. Engaging the population is a complex military operation all in itself. A military involved in post war operations must be able to influence and access the population in order to increase chances of mission accomplishment.

CMO, defined by U.S. joint doctrine, is designed to achieve specific military objectives within a larger military campaign. The framework outlined by CMO doctrine emphasizes that a unity of effort must exist between military and non-military elements, but in practice this is not always the case. Civilians and military actors will always work in the same space and have to adapt to each other's presence. Though civilian and humanitarian components have various goals and missions, these objectives can be aligned with a military mission. When those goals do not line up, civilian and military actors can at least coexist in the same area of operations. Training and education amongst civilians and military actors alike can increase the likelihood of harmonizing goals. The case study of the UPDF exemplifies that training, especially on the military end of the spectrum can increase the chances of CMO synchronizing with civilian counterparts in the post conflict environment.

The UPDF case study examined how an army can apply the basic principles of CMO within its own borders. CMO theory and doctrine have been primarily developed by western nations and applied by armies on foreign soil. But with the rise of intrastate conflicts, the chances that a developing nation will be forced to conduct post conflict operations on its own territory are higher than ever. The UPDF's actions in Northern Uganda proved that an army can use the basic concepts of CMO intended for foreign operations on its own population, both assisting in economic recovery and improving public perceptions of the government.

The UPDF's integration of CMO had two purposes. First, the UPDF directly assisted in post conflict reconstruction in Northern Uganda. By rebuilding the north and reintegrating the Acholi population back with the rest of Uganda, the government could address core grievances of economic and political marginalization. Secondly, the UPDF had twenty years of poor public image to repair. CMO proved to be a relatively quick way to regain the trust and confidence of the north. For the government, in particular the UPDF, CMO presented a great PR move. The use of CMO principles within Uganda's own borders resulted increased approval ratings of the UPDF, President Museveni, and NRM. The UPDF managed to recover considerable ground from twenty years of human rights violations and abuses towards the north by effectively applying CMO tactics.

A. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The possibility of the LRA returning to North Uganda is a distant but real possibility and Ugandans considers the continued existence of the LRA a security threat. The UPDF has displayed a progressive approach to recovering from the devastation caused by the LRA conflict. As the country continues to recover from the violence caused by the war, the UPDF is conducting kinetic operations in neighboring countries to hunt and kill Joseph Kony. The lessons learned from the conflict in Northern Uganda should not be forgotten as the UPDF carries on with its counter-LRA mission. As the UPDF sets out to conduct combat operations in CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan, it must stay focused on those civilian populations. The LRA is known for its violent reprisals against civilians in the wake of UPDF combat operations. Protecting the population is an essential task; otherwise locals will be less likely to assist the UPDF with intelligence and

information on the LRA's location. CMO presents a means for the UPDF to gain trust, access, and approval from the local populations.

The regional fight against the LRA continues. The countries of CAR, South Sudan, Uganda, and the DRC have all been affected by the violence and brutality of the LRA against their respective populations. Though each government prioritizes the LRA threat relatively low compared their other security problems, all four countries have engaged in limited joint operations to eliminate the LRA.²²⁰ All of these armies suffer from poor human rights records and have dismal reputations of protecting their own populations. Implementing CMO activities in the LRA affected areas can provide relief and protection for those populations desperately in need, but more importantly enhance the people's perceptions of the state's capacity to provide for them. CMO can offer the PR boost that these governments need in areas where the state is not seen as favorable or powerful.

Uganda's successful use of CMO in the post conflict environment has future implications for other African nations outside of the Great Lakes Region. Much of the African continent has suffered violent intrastate wars within the past fifty years. In many of these states' the current governments used heavy-handed tactics to control the population and defeat their opponents. Once the war has moved into the post conflict phase, the state and its army have to mend their ties with the population. CMO activities are a method in which a government can repair its reputation, while at the same time contributing to the rebuilding of a war torn area.

Though the UPDF was able to recover from its harsh employment of counterinsurgent tactics through CMO, a state can avoid the entire repairing process if it focuses on gaining popular support during the conflict. This study asserts that the achievements seen in Uganda's post conflict CMO can be applied during all phases of a conflict to include combat operations. By gaining popular support early, the government's chances of victory are not only greater but can be achieved at a faster rate.

220 International Crisis Group. *The Lord's Resistance Army: End Game?* 2011 (18).

Including CMO during combat operations, a state will not require as much work during the post conflict stages, such as repairing a damaged reputation.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICIES AND ENGAGEMENT

In May of 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. Through this act, the U.S. government is legally bound to support the counter-LRA initiatives and contribute to the ongoing recovery in Northern Uganda. In October 2011, the United States sent 100 military personnel into Uganda to assist with the counter-LRA efforts. The primary role of the U.S. presence was to assist and advise the combat operations conducted by the UPDF and the militaries of the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan. The U.S. commitment to maintaining the UPDF as a partner in the region is evident by the deployment of troops in support of counter-LRA operations.²²¹

Uganda is a partner with the United States in terms of regional security and the Global War on Terrorism.²²² The more success Uganda has stabilizing the region through its dynamic use of CMO and non-kinetic operations, the more secure U.S. interests are in Africa. As Uganda builds and improves its capacity to conduct CMO, this skill set can translate to multiple UPDF operations all over the region, ranging from counter-LRA operations to counter-terrorism operations in Somalia. Thus, building Ugandan capacity as a partner is important to the United States.²²³ Finally, as the United States continues to engage in security cooperation and security assistance programs with Uganda, studying the UPDF's goals for CMO can help the U.S. better support, train, equip, or advise Ugandan forces to those ends.

221 International Crisis Group. *The Lord's Resistance Army: End Game?* 2011 (15).

222 "Leadership and Opportunity in Africa." <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/president/africa/13.html> (accessed November 17, 2011).

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